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The Per Se Rule That Ate Maricopa County: Arizona v. Maricopa County
Medical Society' — The extent to which the health care industry should be
governed by the antitrust laws' has been the subject of a lively scholarly
debate.' A major issue in this debate was the proper level of judicial scrutiny to
be afforded business agreements among health care providers and insurers in
light of the conflict between the public's interest in health care cost contain-
ment and the inflationary market forces present in the industry. 4 Although in
Goldfarb a. Virginia State Bar' and National Society of Professional Engineers v, United
States6 the Supreme Court of the United States explicitly rejected the argument
that "professionals," such as physicians, were wholly exempt from the tradi-
tional sweep of the Sherman Antitrust Act,' it nevertheless remained open to
speculation whether the standard of antitrust analysis in future cases was to be
' 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982).
2 15 U.S.C. $$ 1-77 (1976).
3 Shapiro, Cost Containment in the Health Care Field and Antitrust Laws, 7 AM. J.L. &
MED. 425 (1982). See, e.g., Borsody, The Antitrust Laws and the Health Care Industry, 12 AKRON L.
REV. 417 (1979); Havighurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care Financing, 1978
DUKE L.J. 303; Herndon, Competition Policy and the Professions, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 1533 (1979);
Horan & Nord, Application of Antitrust Law to the Health Care Delivery Systems, 9 CUMBERLAND L.
REV. 685 (1979); Kallstrom, Health Care Cost Control by Third Party Payors: Fee Schedules and the Sher-
man Act, 1978 DUKE L.J. 645; Rosdeitcher, Contemporary Issues in Health Care: Cost Containment and
Competition, 17 FORUM 690 (1982); Note, Antitrust and Nonprofit Entities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 802
(1981); Note, The Professions and Noncommercial Purposes, 11 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 387 (1978).
In 1981, health care in America cost $287 billion, representing almost 10% of the na-
tion's gross national product. See Keisling, Radical Surgery: Let's Draft The Doctors, THE
WASHINGTON MONTHLY, February 1983, at 26. Of that figure, $55 billion went to physicians,
representing an increase of 17% over the previous year. See PARADE MAGAZINE, October 17,
1982, at 10. Additionally, employee health insurance premiums for the nation's largest com-
panies have risen nearly 25% in 1983, the largest increase since World War II. Keisling, supra
note 4, at 26.
There appears to be general agreement among observers that the current structure of
the health care market contributes greatly to ever-escalating health care costs in the United
States. See Rosdeitcher, supra note 3, at 691; Keisling, supra note 4, at 27-29. Rosdeitcher notes,
for example, that the health services system is not a classic competitive market because the law of
supply and demand does not govern the system. Rosdeitcher, supra note 3, at 691. Rather, he
points out, various well known factors contribute to a lack of traditional free market price
discipline. Id. First, the doctor-patient relationship may obscure objective consumer assessments
of quality. Id. Second, complex medical advances frustrate informed consumer selection and pro-
mote excessive deference to professional judgments. Id. Third, the consumer's concern for his or
her health usually makes price a secondary consideration. Id. Finally, and most importantly, the
prevalence of public and third party payors insulates consumers from the true cost of health care.
Id. As health care providers compete for these enormous subsidized expenditures, the consumer's
concern for the best possible care and concomitant insensitivity to price spur the providers to con-
tinually initiate new, sophisticated and expensive services—often without any relation to actual
community demand. Id. at 692. According to Rosdeitcher, the result of such misallocation is the
creation of an artificial level of consumer demand which parallels the escalating supply of costly
medical services. Id. See also Weller, Antitrust and Health Care: Provider Controlled Health Plans and the
Maricopa Derision, 8 AM. J.L. & MED. 223, 224-5 (Fall 1982).
3 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
6 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
15 U.S.C. $$ 1-7 (1976).
1087
1088	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 24:1087
the same for both professional and non-professional enterprises. 8 Recently, in
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 9 the Supreme Court held that an
agreement among physicians and health insurers to establish and abide by
maximum fee reimbursement schedules was per se illegal price fixing under sec-
tion 1 10
 of the Sherman Act." By so holding, the Court dispelled any previous
notions that an agreement among physicians or other professionals found to be
clearly anticompetitive might be looked upon more leniently by virtue of either
its proconsumer nature or its non-commercial market setting.
Maricopa County is thus a significant decision in that the Court explicitly
and unequivocally applied traditional antitrust rules to business arrangements
involving professionals. More significant, however, was the Court's perfunc-
tory condemnation of the maximum fee reimbursement agreements on a
limited summary judgment record — a record which arguably supported an in-
ference that the challenged agreements achieved substantial economic efficien-
cies not otherwise attainable to the benefit of health care consumers." The ma-
jority's decision and rationale prompted Justice Powell to question in dissent
both the Court's interpretation of antitrust precedent and its conception of the
consumer welfare purpose underlying the Sherman Act."
In Maricopa County, the respondent foundations for medical care (FMCs)"
were non-profit corporations organized by their respective county medical
societies for the purpose of promoting cost-effective, fee-for-service health
care." The foundations each promulgated a schedule of maximum fee reim-
bursement levels 16
 which participating physicians" contractually agreed to ac-
e See infra notes 123-57 and accompanying text.
9
 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982).
10 Section 1 prohibits leivery contract, combination, . • or conspiracy in restraint of
trade or commerce
	 " 15 U.S.C. Si (1976).
" Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2466-80.
" See infra notes 206-66 and accompanying text.
13 Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2480-85 (Powell, J., dissenting).
" Foundations for Medical Care (FMCs) are associations of physicians who provide
prepaid health care. Kallstrom, supra note 3, at 680. Unlike health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) and conventional insurance plans, however, FMCs are sponsored or managed by state
or county medical societies. Id. FMC health plans set maximum limits on the fee paid to a par-
ticipating physician for a particular health service. Id. Generally, FMCs also provide peer review
of fees and utilization (frequency with which a physician orders specific health care procedures).
Id. See also Havighurst, supra note 3, at 315-16.
The respondent foundations in Maricapa County were Maricopa Foundation for Medical
Care and Pima Foundation for Medical Care. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 643
F.2d 553, 554 (9th Cir. 1980). The remaining respondent was Maricopa County Medical Socie-
ty, Id. The Pima County Medical Society, originally joined, was dismissed from the suit under a
consent order. Id. at 554 n.2.
" Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2470 (1982); Joint
Brief for Respondents at 8-9, Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Respondents].
16 At the time the suit was filed, each foundation made use of relative values and con-
version factors in compiling a schedule of maximum reimbursement levels. The relative value
was the numerical value assigned to a particular service performed by the physician (e.g., an of-
fice examination). The conversion factor was the dollar amount for a given medical specialty
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cept as payment in full for services rendered to patients insured under
foundation-approved insurance plans. 18
 Additionally, the foundations were
authorized to draw funds to pay physician's bills from insurance company ac-
counts as well as review the appropriateness and medical necessity of treatment
rendered to insured patients.' 9
 Participating physicians were free to charge
higher fees to uninsured patients and lower fees to those insured under the
plan." Moreover, insured patients were free to visit non-participating physi-
cians for care, but the FMC insurance guaranteed payment only up to the pre-
set maximum for the specific care received. 2 '
In 1978, the State of Arizona filed a civil complaint against the Maricopa
and Pima foundations for medical care and their respective county medical
societies alleging an illegal price fixing conspiracy under section 1 of the Sher-
man Act. 22
 After a limited pretrial discovery period, the state moved for partial
summary judgment on the issue of liability on the ground that the foundations'
(e.g., surgery). The actual maximum reimbursable amount for a given procedure was then deter-
mined by multiplying the applicable relative value by the applicable conversion factor. Arizona
v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2471 (1982); Brief for Petitioner at 4-5,
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief
for Petitioner].
Each foundation discontinued the use of this computation method in 1980 and the
Maricopa FMC revised its by-laws to give its Board of Trustees the power to adopt reimburse-
ment levels without a vote of the membership. Brief for Respondents at 10 n.29. The Supreme
Court nevertheless held that the suit was not mooted as a result of the changes. Maricopa County,
102 S. Ct. at 2471 n.9.
" Approximately 70% of the private practicing doctors of medicine, osteopathy and
podiatry in Maricopa County were members of the Maricopa Foundation at the time of trial.
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2470 (1982). There was some
dispute, however, as to the exact percentage of Pima County physicians participating in the Pima
Foundation. The available estimates ranged from 30% to 80%. Id. at 2471 n.8.
18 Id. at 2471. For an insurer to receive FMC approval, it had to agree to reimburse the
physician for medical services rendered to insured patients at fee levels not to exceed the max-
imum established for any particular procedure by the FMC except at the insurer's discretion. Id.
Also, the insurer had to agree to cover all the medical services described in the foundation's
minimum standards. Id.; Brief for Respondents at 11.
=9
	 v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2471 (1982). In this
regard, Maricopa FMC was considered an insurance administrator by the Arizona Department
of Insurance. Id.
'" Id. Member physicians were free to associate with any other medical insurers or self-
insuring health care consumers. Brief for Respondents at 25 n.77. Moreover, physician members
agreed that membership would not affect their billing levels. Id. at 9-10, 25. Likewise, any par-
ticipating insurer could deal with any individual member physician in an attempt to bargain for a
fee which was lower than the maximum reimbursement level and, conversely, was free to pay the
physician more than the maximum. Id. at 25 n.77.
' 1
 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2471-72 (1982).
22 Id. at 2469. The case was brought under both section 1 of the Sherman Act and the
Arizona Uniform Antitrust Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 55 44-1401 (1978). Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical SoC'y [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,694, at 77,893 (D. Ariz.
1979). On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit interpreted both laws
as in conformity. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 653 F.2d 553, 553 n.1 (9th Cir.
1980). The state sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the physicians agreed-upon
maximum fee reimbursement schedules. Brief for Petitioner at 12.
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maintenance of the maximum fee reimbursement schedules was a per se viola-
tion of the Act. 23 The district court denied the motion, but certified the issue for
interlocutory appea1. 24 In denying the state's motion, the trial court held that
the challenged agreements were more appropriately analyzed under a Rule of
Reason, 25 rather than a per se, 26 approach and, therefore, the pretrial record
was insufficient to support summary judgment."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a divided
vote, affirmed the lower court's refusal to enter judgment. 28 A majority of the
panel held that the court knew too little about the competitive effects of the
FMC schedules on the relevant health care markets to characterize 29 them as
per se illegal price fixing. 3° The appeals court further held that even under a
Rule of Reason approach the court was also unable, without a more complete
record upon which to judge the competitive impact of the system, to determine
whether the FMC health insurance plans were an unreasonable and therefore
illegal restraint on competition."
In a four to three decision," the Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the appeals court and held that the maximum fee reimbursement schedules
23 Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2469.
24 Id. The question certified for interlocutory appeal by the district court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 1292(6) (1976) was whether the FMC agreements were illegal per se under section 1 of
the Sherman Act. Id.
25 Maricopa County [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH), at 77,897. Under a Rule of Reason
analysis, courts attempt to balance the harms to competition that result from the challenged prac-
tice with the potential procompetitive benefits of practice, and additionally decide whether those
benefits which are allegedly associated with the practice might be realized in a manner less
restrictive of competition. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 5 68, at
186, 188 (1976); see also infra notes 43-55 and accompanying text.
26 As a general rule, per se liability has been imposed when the challenged practice is
pernicious and generally without redeeming value. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5 (1958). For a detailed discussion of the development and application of the per se con-
cept under section 1 of the Sherman Act, see infra notes 56-124 and accompanying text.
27
 Maricopa County [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH), at 77,897.
25 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 643 F.2d 553, 555 (9th Cir. 1980). The
opinion for the three judge panel was written by Circuit Judge Sneed. Circuit Judge Kennedy
filed a concurring opinion. Senior District Judge Larson, sitting by designation, filed the dissent-
ing opinion. Id. at 553.
29 As the term is used in this article, "characterization" is the analytical process used
by the courts to determine whether the challenged practice falls within an established category of
conduct deemed per se illegal (e.g., price fixing). Once the challenged practice is properly
characterized as within a forbidden category, it is facially illegal regardless of any benefits which
might result from the practice. See generally Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S.
Ct. 2466, 2480-85 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 214-22 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of per se characterization in the context of the appeals court decision in
Maricopa County, see Casenote, Antitrust—Foundations for Medical Care: Characterization of Maximum
Fee Schedules—Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 1981 ARIZONA ST. L.J. 293.
" Maricopa County, 643 F.2d at 556-58.
31 Id.
" The majority opinion was written by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall and White. Justice Powell filed a dissent, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist. Justices O'Connor and Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
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agreed upon by physicians participating in the FMC health insurance system
were price fixing agreements and, therefore, per se illegal under section 1 of the
Sherman Act. 33
 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, refused to recognize
either the horizontal, maximum nature of the reimbursement schedules, 34 the
respondents' status as professionals," or the Court's inexperience with the
health care industry36
 as sufficient basis to avoid per se condemnation of the
agreements. Justice Stevens also refused to hold that the per se rule against price
fixing was inapplicable because of the procompetitive justifications asserted by
the respondent foundations." In this regard, he pointed out that the an-
ticompetitive potential inherent in all price fixing agreements justified their per
se invalidation regardless of whether procompetitive justifications were offered
for some. 38
 Finally, Justice Stevens concluded that the challenged FMC
agreements did not "fix prices" in only a literal sense, but instead fit directly
into a horizontal price fixing mold unlawful on its face. 39
Justice Powell, writing for the dissent, placed primary emphasis on the
novelty of the FMC insurance plans and their potential for procompetitive effi-
ciencies and consumer benefits in the health care industry."' He criticized the
majority for its unexplained and mechanical characterization of the reimburse-
ment schedules as per se illegal price fixing in light of past judicial application of
the per se rules and the limited summary judgment record before the Court."
According to Justice Powell, the majority's decision lost sight of the consumer
welfare purpose of the Sherman Act and in doing so "condemn[ed] a novel
plan about which it [knew] very little." 42
The Maricopa County Court's concern for the integrity of the rule against
price fixing clearly did outweigh its consideration of the asserted economic and
consumer benefits associated with the FMC plan. This misplaced emphasis
caused the Court summarily — and therefore prematurely — to reject the
reimbursement agreements as facially unlawful. The majority's opinion
underscores the predominant drawback to an overly simplistic per se approach
to antitrust analysis — expedient judicial condemnation of business ar-
rangements which may substantially increase competition or economic efficiency
and thereby benefit the consumer. Accordingly, this casenote will argue for a
33 Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2480.
34 Id. at 2475.
35
 Id, at 2475-76.
" Id. at 2476-77.
" Id. at 2477-78.
58 Id. at 2477.
39 Id. at 2480.
40 Id. at 2480-85 (Powell, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 2481-85. In particular, Justice Powell criticized the majority for failing to
enunciate clearly the criteria by which a novel practice is to be characterized as within a per se
category such as price fixing. Id. at 2483-84. He pointed out that here the majority was "content
simply to brand this type of plan as 'price fixing' ...." Id. at 2484.
42 Id. at 2485.
1092	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 24:1087
more flexible approach to per se analysis — one that recognizes the necessity of
additional inquiry in the face of a novel, potentially procompetitive or substan-
tial efficiency-creating business arrangement operating in a market, such as
health care, which fails to contain consumer costs. It is submitted that per se
flexibility mandates a preliminary, realistic judicial consideration of such an
arrangement's probable economic effects before it is fatally labelled as per se il-
legal. It is further submitted that this approach is neither inconsistent with an-
titrust precedent nor with the litigation efficiency and predictability notions
underlying the per se rules.
This casenote will begin with a brief discussion of the scope of judicial an-
titrust analysis under section 1 of the Sherman Act, including the Supreme
Court's treatment of agreements among professionals. The Supreme Court's
decision in Maricopa County will then be scrutinized in light of such precedent,
Justice Powell's dissent and the lower court opinions. Specifically, this casenote
will focus on the Court's speculative consideration and dismissal, on a limited
summary judgment record, of the procompetitive-efficiency justifications
asserted by the respondent foundations as a basis for avoiding per se liability.
Further, a standard stressing flexibility and consumer welfare will be proposed
as a basis for future judicial analysis. Finally, this standard will be applied to
the facts of Maricopa County and its effectiveness considered in light of the tradi-
tional policies behind the per se rule against price fixing.
I. THE BACKGROUND OF MARICOPA COUNTY
A. Antitrust Analysis under the Sherman Act: A Bifurcated System
1. The Rule of Reason
Section 1 of the Sherman Act literally prohibits every contract, trust or
conspiracy in restraint of trade." The Supreme Court has long recognized,
however, that Congress could not have intended a strict prohibition of all such
associations." The Court's early response to the broad prohibition of section 1
" 15 U.S.C. 5 1 (1976). At common law, only contracts which were unreasonable
restraints of trade were illegal. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290,
327-28 (1897). Initially, however, the Supreme Court strictly interpreted the language of the
Sherman Act to mean that all agreements in restraint of trade or commerce were illegal. In Trans-
Missouri, for example, in response to the defendant's argument that the Act should be read to
comport with the common law, Justice Peckham stated:
[The Court is] asked to read into the act by way of judicial legislation an exception
that is not placed there by the law making branch of the Government, and this is to
be done upon the theory that the impolicy of such legislation is so clear that it cannot
be supposed that Congress intended the natural import of the language used. This
we cannot and ought not to do. That impolicy is not so clear, nor are there reasons
for the exception so potent as to permit us to interpolate an exception into the
language of the act, and thus to materially alter its meaning and effect.
Id. at 340.
" United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898). One year after Trans-
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was a reasonableness standard — termed the Rule of Reason — which focused
on the challenged agreement's effect on competition. 45 The Rule of Reason ap-
proach was first explicitly adopted by the Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States." Rejecting a literal interpretation of the Sherman Act, Chief Justice
White noted that absent a reasonableness standard, future enforcement of the
statute — as well as realization of the public policy it established — would be
impossible. 47 He noted that the same standard of reason applied at common
law was intended to be applied under the statute." The Chief Justice thus con-
cluded that only contracts or acts which were unreasonably restrictive of com-
petitive conditions were illegal.° According to Chief Justice White, such
unreasonableness might arise either from the anticompetitive nature or
character of the contracts or acts, or where the surrounding circumstances
reveal the arrangements to be of such a character as to give rise to the inference
that they were intended to restrain trade. 5 °
Missouri, in Joint Traffic, Justice Peckham qualified his previous strict interpretation of the Sher-
man Act:
To suppose, as is assumed by counsel, that the effect of the decision in the Trans-
Missouri case is to render illegal most business contracts or combinations, however
indispensable and necessary they may be, because „ . they all restrain trade in
some remote and indirect degree, is to make a most violent assumption and one not
called for or justified by the decision mentioned, or by any other decision of this
court.
Id. at 568.
" Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); see also, Chicago Bd. of Trade
v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
46
 221 U.S. at 1. In Standard Oil Co., the United States brought suit against 71 corpora-
tions and partnerships and seven individuals charging that the various defendants conspired to
restrain trade and monopolize commerce in petroleum, refined oil and other petroleum products.
Id. at 31.
" Id. at 68.
" Id. at 60, The Chief Justice reasoned that:
[As] the contracts or acts embraced in the provision were not expressly defined,
since the enumeration addressed itself simply to classes of acts, those classes being
broad enough to embrace every conceivable contract or combination and thus
caused any act done by any of the enumerated methods anywhere in the whole field
of human activity to be illegal if in restraint of trade, it inevitably follows that the
provision necessarily called for the exercise of judgment which required that some
standard be resorted to [to determine whether the statute had been violated] [I]t
follows that it was intended that the standard of reason which had been applied at
common law was intended to be the measure used [by the courts]. .
Id.
49 Id. at 58-60.
5° Id. Describing the common law foundation upon which judicial interpretation of the
Sherman Act was to be based, Chief Justice White noted:
[I]t may be with accuracy said that the dread of enhancennent of prices and of other
wrongs which it was thought would flow from the undue limitations on competitive
conditions caused by contracts or other acts of individuals or corporations, led, as a
matter of public policy, to the prohibition or treating as illegal all contracts or acts
which were unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions, either from the
nature or character of the contract or act or where the surrounding circumstances
were such as to justify the conclusion that they had not been entered into or per-
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As subsequently applied by the Court, the Rule of Reason approach to
antitrust analysis has given the Sherman Act both definition and flexibility."
Consistent with Standard Oil, the present day Rule requires the trier of fact to
examine all the facts and circumstances surrounding the challenged agreement
to determine whether that agreement constitutes an unreasonable restraint on
competition." The Court has made it clear, however, that proper judicial in-
quiry under the Rule requires emphasis on the economic and not the public in-
terest implication of any particular agreement. 53 The Rule of Reason approach
does not sanction inquiry into any argument in favor of a challenged practice
simply because it is within the realm of reason." Instead, it focuses directly on
whether the purpose or effect of the challenged practice may be said to affect
competitive conditions adversely, given the facts peculiar to the business, the
history of the particular restraint and the reasons the restraint was imposed."
2. The Per Se Rules
The Rule of Reason thus provides the judiciary with an effective tool for
antitrust analysis and enforcement. The Supreme Court, however, has con-
formed with the legitimate purpose of reasonably forwarding personal interest and
developing trade, but on the contrary, were of such a character as to give rise to the
inference or presumption that they had been entered into or done with the intent to
do wrong to the general public and to limit the right of individuals, thus restraining
the free flow of commerce and tending to bring about the evils, such as enhancement
of prices, which were considered to be against public policy.
Id. at 58.
One commentator has concluded that Chief justice White developed a Rule of Reason
keyed to avoiding the consequences of a monopoly and placed on the judiciary the duty of
performing economic analysis to determine when the evils of monopoly were present. See, Bork,
The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division [I], 74 YALE L. J. 775,
803-04 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Bork, Market Division].
5 ' National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
" In Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), Justice Brandeis of-
fered his interpretation of the Rule of Reason:
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to
restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint im-
posed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that
question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to
which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restaint was im-
posed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of
the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not
because good intention will otherwise save an objectionable regulation or the
reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and
predict consequences.
Id. at 238.
" National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
54 Id at 688.
55 Id. at 692; Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); cf. Con-
tinental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) ("Under [the Rule of
Reason], the factfinder weighs all the circumstances in a case in deciding whether a restrictive
practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.")
July 1983]	 CASENOTES	 1095
eluded that when the clear purpose or effect of a particular business practice is
to stifle competition, advantages derived from the Rule's flexibility are out-
weighed by notions of judicial efficiency and business certainty." Such a prac-
tice is deemed per se illegal." Once the challenged agreement is characterized
by the trier of fact as falling within a category of activity which the Supreme
Court has determined to be per se illegal, the broad scope of inquiry demanded
by the Rule of Reason approach is unnecessary, and additional proof of busi-
ness justifications or competitive benefits is deemed irrelevant." Although per
se rules require the courts to make generalizations concerning the potential
anticompetitive consequences of certain commercial practices," such
generalizations are acceptable once the judiciary has had considerable ex-
perience with certain business relationships. 60 Per re rules reflect a judgment
that although cases not fitting exactly within the generalization may arise, such
cases are not sufficiently common or important to justify the time and expense
necessary to identify them." To understand more fully those situations in
36
 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1979); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977).
In Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the court elaborated on the
rationale underlying such a determination:
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect
on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm
they have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of per se
unreasonableness not only makes the types of restraints which are proscribed by the
Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids
the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation
into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an ef-
fort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable—an
inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.
Id. at 5.
57 Id.; see also National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
692 (1978) ("agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no
elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality ... are illegal per se").
Practices which the Court has thus far held to be illegal per se include price fixing, group
boycotts, division of markets and tying arrangements. See Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales Inc.,
446 U.S. 643 (1980) (price fixing); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940) (same); United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (same); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (group boycott): Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (same); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S.
593 (1951) (division of markets); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir.
1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (same); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958)
(tying arrangement).
58
 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
39
 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977) ("Per se
rules thus require the Court to make broad generalizations about the social utility of particular
commercial practices.")
6° United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). The court in Topco noted
that "[i]t is only after considerable experience with certain business relationships that courts
classify them as per se violations of the Sherman Act." Id. at 607-08. See also infra notes 218, 228
and accompanying text.
61
 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977).
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which the Supreme Court is likely to characterize challenged conduct as per se
illegal — and, conversely, those situations in which it might refuse to apply per
se rules to concerted activity which arguably restrains competition — it is in-
structive to examine briefly the development of the per se doctrine prior to the
Court's decision in Maricopa County.
The concept of per se analysis can be traced back to the language of the
Supreme Court's earliest interpretations of the Sherman Act." In United States
v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association," Justice Peckham, writing for the majority,
articulated a conceptual basis of per se liability for a rate agreement involving
eighteen competing railroad companies by noting that the "direct, immediate,
and necessary" effect of the cartel agreement was to restrain illegally trade or
commerce within the meaning of the Act." One year later, in United States v.
Joint Traffic Association," the Court confronted a rate fixing agreement that was
substantially similar to the agreement disposed of in Trans-Missouri. 66 Writing
62 See generally Boric, Market Division, supra note 50, at 781-806; L. SULLIVAN, supra note
25, 55 64-67, at 167-86.
63 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
" Id. at 342. In Tram-Missouri, the railroad companies formed an association for the
"purpose of mutual protection by establishing and maintaining reasonable rates, rules and
regulations on all freight traffic." Id. at 292. A committee was appointed to establish a freight
rate structure applicable to all the participants. Id. at 294.
Subsequently, the United States filed a bill in the Circuit Court of the United States for
the District of Kansas to have the agreement between the defendant railroad companies declared
illegal and to have the association dissolved. Id. at 297. The circuit court dismissed the bill and
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Id. at
304. The Government then appealed to the Supreme Court. Id.
Concluding that the Sherman Antitrust Act applied to railroads and rendered illegal all
agreements in restraint of trade or commerce, Justice Peckham noted that the agreement's viola-
tion of the Act could not be made valid by allegations of good intentions or the desire to maintain
reasonable rates. Id. at 341. The issue, he pointed out, was whether the agreement restrained
trade or commerce within the meaning of the Act. Id. In this regard, Justice Peckham emphas-
ized that the association was formed for the sole purpose of adopting standardized rates. Id.
There could be no doubt, he concluded, that the agreement's "direct, immediate and necessary"
effect was to restrain trade or commerce. Id. at 341-42.
65 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
66 In Joint Traffic, 31 railroad companies formed an association, whose affairs were ad-
ministered by several different boards, in which participants agreed to abide by a duly published
schedule of rates, fares and charges. Id. at 505-06. It was further agreed that the powers con-
ferred upon the managers of the boards should be exercised so as not to permit violation of the In-
terstate Commerce Act, and managers should cooperate with the ICC to secure uniformity in
rates, fares and charges. Id. at 506. The United States subsequently filed a bill in the Circuit
Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York seeking declaratory and injunc-
tive relief. Id. at 505-06. As in Trans-Missouri, the circuit court dismissed the bill and its decree
was affirmed by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Id. at 509.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Joint Traffic Association attempted to distinguish
their agreement from Trans-Missouri by the fact that the agreed upon rates were on file and in-
ferentially approved by the ICC. Id. at 539-40. Joint Traffic argued that the Trans-Missouri agree-
ment did not have any such established basis for the reasonableness of its rates. Id. at 540. Justice
Peckham noted, however, that he could see no substantial difference between the two cases in the
methods of establishing rates and fares. Id. at 562-65. He reasoned that the "natural and direct
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for the Court, Justice Peckham again concluded that the clear effect of the
agreement was to eliminate competition between the parties. 67 As such, the
Court held that the agreement was illegal without regard for the reasonableness
of the rates agreed upon" or the necessity of the restraint as a means of pre-
venting "ruinous competition" in the industry. 69
In Standard Oil Co. , 7° Chief Justice White's opinion for the Court found
nothing inconsistent with his newly enunciated Rule of Reason and Justice
Peckham's refusal to apply a reasonableness standard in either Trans-Missouri
or Joint Traffic!' Explaining Justice Peckham's rulings in per se terms, the Chief
Justice pointed out that the necessary effect of the rate fixing agreements be-
tween the railroads placed them clearly within the purview of the Act as
restraints of trade, and as such they could not be taken out of that category by a
general inquiry into their expediency or the wisdom of the statute." In this
regard, Chief Justice White further noted that the general confusion surround-
ing Justice Peckham's literal interpretation of section 1 of the Sherman Act in
Trans-Missouri resulted from a failure to distinguish between the Court's lack of
effect of the two agreements is the same, viz., to maintain rates at a higher level that would other-
wise prevail .... " Id. at 565.
67 Id. at 565, 577. Although Joint Traffic did not overrule Trans-Missouri, Justice
Peckham did cut back on his former strict interpretation of the language of the Act. See supra notes
43-44. He did so by distinguishing between contracts whose direct and immediate effect was a
restraint upon interstate commerce, and those whose effect was indirect or incidental only. Joint
Traffic, 171 U.S. at 568. Justice Peckham thus pointed out that an agreement entered into for the
purpose of promoting a legitimate business interest, with no purpose to thereby affect or restrain
interstate commerce, and which did not directly do so, would not be covered by the Act despite
an indirect and remote effect on such commerce. Id. In light of this distinction, Justice Peckham
emphasized that the clear intent and direct effect of the Joint Traffic agreement was to destroy
competition and maintain rates above what competition might otherwise produce. Id. at 569.
" Id. at 565, 574. As in Trans-Missouri, Justice Peckham rejected the association's argu-
ment that the reasonableness of the agreed upon rates should affect the agreement's legality
under the Act. Id. In Trans-Missouri, Justice Peckham rejected the reasonable-rate argument
based upon the judicial uncertainty of such a standard. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 331-32 (1897). He pointed out that "No say, therefore, that the Act ex-
cludes agreements ... which tend to simply keep up reasonable rates for transportation, is
substantially to leave the question of reasonableness to the companies themselves." Id. at 332; see
also infra note 78.
" Joint Traffic, 171 U.S. at 576-77. The association argued that one effect of such com-
petition would be to grant the survivor a monopoly, resulting in higher prices. Id. at 576. To that
extent, therefore, the association asserted that their agreement was promotive of trade and com-
petition. Id. at 575-76. Justice Peckham responded that an agreement which "directly and effec-
tually" prevents competition, restrains trade and commerce. Id. at 577. As such, he concluded, it
must be regarded as under the Act regardless of the possibility that a restraint of trade might also
follow competition. Id.
7° 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
71 Id. at 63-68.
72 Id. at 65. Chief Justice White further explained that the two cases "decided that the
nature and character of the contracts, creating as they did a conclusive presumption which
brought them within the statute, such result was not to be disregarded by a substitution of
judicial appreciation of what the law ought to be for the plain judicial duty of enforcing the law as
it was made." Id.
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power to take a plainly anticompetitive practice out of the operation of the Act
by a resort to reason, and the Court's duty in every case — where it became
necessary from the nature of the conduct and the character of the parties — to
decide whether in fact the statute was applicable, using the light of reason."
Thus, in Standard Oil Co. , while enunciating the new Rule of Reason ap-
proach, Chief Justice White also recognized and accepted the per se concepts
stemming from Justice Peckham's decisions in Trans-Missouri and Joint
Traffic. 74 Together, these early Supreme Court cases were important to the de-
velopment of the modern per se approach in two respects. First, they established
that a challenged agreement's impact on competition was the proper basis of
judicial inquiry under the Sherman Act." Second, they advanced the current
per se concept that certain business practices are so clearly anticompetitive in
purpose or effect that they should be conclusively presumed illegal within the
meaning of the statute."
3. The Per Se Rule Against Price Fixing
Both Trans-Missouri and Joint Traffic involved clear minimum price
restraints or minimum "price fixing" agreements among competitors. 77 The
Court's response to these agreements illustrates its long-standing belief that
such conduct is blatantly anticompetitive and, therefore, in and of itself illegal
under the Sherman Act without regard to either the reasonableness of the
prices fixed" or the industry's need to eliminate ruinous competitive condi-
tions."
71 Id. at 67. It still remained unclear, however, when a combination not to compete was
plainly within the statute so as to preclude further judicial inquiry under the new Rule of Reason.
Professor Bork suggested that Chief justice White's standard was premised on a distinction be-
tween normal agreements in trade and agreements which create the evils of a monopoly. Bork,
Market Division, supra note 50, at 829.
74 See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 25, 5 65, at 174.
" Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911); United States v. Joint
Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 577 (1898); see also L. SULLIVAN, supra note 25, 5 64, at 169, 171.
76 See Standard Oil Ca., 221 U.S. at 65; L. SULLIVAN, Supra note 25, 55 64, 65, at 169,
174.
" See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 565 (1898); United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 341 (1897). See generally, Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 64-68 (1911).
As generally defined in the context of antitrust law, "price fixing" is a shorthand way of
describing certain business behavior to which the per se rule has been held applicable by the
Supreme Court. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S., 1, 9
(1979).
78 United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). In Trenton Potteries,
manufacturers and distributors of 82% of the vitreous pottery fixtures produced in the United
States were convicted at trial of combining to fix prices and limit sales in interstate commerce to
approved jobbers. Id. at 394. The defendants argued that their conduct was not an unreasonable
restraint of trade because the prices fixed were reasonable. Id. at 395-96. In a classic rejection of
this standard cartel defense, Justice Stone noted:
The aim and result of every price fixing agreement, if effective, is the elimination of
one form of competition. The power to fix prices, whether reasonably exercised or
July 1983]	 CASENOTES	 1099
The per se unlawfulness of agreements to fix prices was made explicit in
United States v. Socany-Vacuum Oil Co.t'°, In Socony- Vacuum, various competitors
were convicted of conspiring to raise and maintain spot prices for gasoline by
buying up "distress" gasoline on the spot market and eliminating it as a price
factor within the general market. 8 ' The evidence at trial tended to show that
the competitors' concerted program to regularly remove part of the spot market
supply of gasoline was one factor which had stabilized the spot market and
thereby caused an increase in gasoline prices. 82 Writing for the majority,
Justice Douglas held that the challenged program was a price fixing agreement
and, therefore, a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act." Condemning
not, involves power to control the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable
prices. The reasonable price fixed today may through economic and business
changes become the unreasonable price of tomorrow ... Agreements which create
such potential power may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or unlawful
restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry whether a particular price is
reasonable ....
Id. at 397.
79 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940) ("[P]rice fixing
agreements are unlawful per se under the Sherman Act and ... no showing of so-called corn-
petitive abuses or evils which those agreements were designed to eliminate or alleviate may be in-
terposed as a defense."); see also supra note 69.
88 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
61 Id.
82
 Id. at 219. The defendants attempted to distinguish Trenton Potteries on the ground
that, unlike the cartel of pottery manufacturers and distributor in that case, they did not control
a large share of the gasoline market, and thus did not have the market power to cause a price rise
for gasoline. Id. at 218-19. Noting the evidence showed that the defendant's buying program at
least contributed to an increase in price and stability of the spot markets, and to price increases
for gasoline sold in the Midwest, Justice Douglas concluded that "[p]roof that there was a con-
spiracy, that its purpose was to raise prices, and that it caused or contributed to a price rise is
proof of the actual consummation or execution of a conspiracy under 1 of the Sherman Act."
Id. at 219-20.
a' Id. at 224. Justice Douglas held:
Proof that a combination was formed for the purpose of fixing prices and it caused
them to be fixed or contributed to that result is proof of the completion of a price fix-
ing conspiracy under S 1 of the Act. The indictment in this case charged that this
combination had that purpose and effect. And there was abundant evidence to sup-
port it.
Id. (emphasis added).
In a footnote, however, Justice Douglas qualified this standard of proof by noting that
both a purpose and a power to fix prices are not necessary to establish a conspiracy under section
1 of the Act. Id. at 224-25 n.59. He reasoned that a conspiracy to fix prices is illegal even though
no overt act is shown, the conspirators lacked the means to accomplish their objective and the
conspiracy involved only a part of interstate or foreign commerce. Id. at 225 n.59. According to
Justice Douglas, agreements as to prices might still have utility to the members of a combination
regardless of whether the agreements were intended to completely eliminate price competition
and regardless of whether the combination had the power to control the market. Id. at 225 n.59.
Instead, he noted, the effectiveness of price fixing agreements depended upon various factors in-
cluding "competitive tactics, position in the industry [and] the formula underlying price
policies." Id. at 225-26 n.59. Justice Douglas concluded that an intent and a power to produce a
prohibited result was necessary only in cases where the offense charged is the actual monopol-
izing of trade or commerce in violation of 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 226 n.59.
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any agreement which tampers with price structures, Justice Douglas stated that
under the Act "a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of
raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in
interstate commerce . is illegal per se." 94 As part of this sweeping denuncia-
tion, he noted that regardless of any economic justification that a particular
price fixing agreement might be thought to have, the law would not permit fur-
ther inquiry into its reasonableness. 85 All such agreements are illegal, Justice
Douglas concluded, because of their actual or potential effect on price."
Justice Douglas' language in Socony-Vacuum concerning activities which
depressed the price of a commodity implied that maximum price restraints were
also covered under the per se rule against price fixing." This implication re-
mained dictum, however, until the Supreme Court's decision in Kiefer-Stewart
Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. 88 In Kiefer-Stewart, two affiliated liquor pro-
ducers refused to sell to wholesale customers who would not agree to resell their
product at pre-set maximum prices." Justice Black, writing for the Court, held
that the appeals court had erred in holding that the agreement did not violate
the Sherman Act because the maximum resale prices promoted rather than
restrained competition." In a brief explanation, Justice Black reasoned that
the maximum price agreements, like minimum price fixing agreements, "crip-
ple[d] the freedom of traders and thereby restrain[ed] their ability to sell in ac-
cordance with their own judgment."" Thus reaffirming the strict Socony-
Vacuum standard, Justice Black held the agreements to be per se illegal price fix-
ing."
Seventeen years later, in its 1968 Albrecht v. Herald Co. decision," the
Court reaffirmed both the rationale and the decision in Kiefer-Stewart. 94 In
Albrecht, a newspaper attempted to force one of its independent carriers to con-
form to a suggested maximum resale price." The appeals court held that a
price ceiling was necessary to protect the public from price gouging by dealers
who had monopoly power by virtue of exclusive selling territories." Writing for
the Court, however, Justice White followed the Kiefer-Stewart "freedom of the
84 Id. at 223.
85 Id. at 226 n.59.
88 Id. Specifically, the Socony-Vacuum Court held that all price fixing agreements are
"banned because of their actual or potential threat to the central nervous system of the
economy." Id.
" Id. at 223.
88 340 U.S. 211 (1951); see generally Blair & Kaserman, The Albrecht Rule and Consumer
Welfare: An Economic Analysis, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 461, 463-64 (1981).
89 Kiefer-Stewart, 340 U.S. at 212.
" Id. at 212-13.
91 Id. at 213.
92 Id.
93 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
94 Id. at•152.
95 Id. at 147-50.
96 Id. at 153.
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trader" approach as a basis for reversing the lower court and holding that the
Albrecht maximum resale price scheme was illegal per se." He thus explained
that agreements which fix maximum prices, by substituting the potentially er-
roneous judgment of the seller for the competitive forces of the market, might
severely hamper the efforts of buyers to compete successfully within that
market." As an example, Justice White pointed out that the maximum prices
might be set too low to allow a dealer to furnish essential services incident to the
value of consumer goods or to allow for non-essential conveniences which con-
sumers desire and for which they would be willing to pay." Additionally,
Justice White believed several other potentially adverse effects of maximum
resale price agreements compelled a per se result in Albrecht. He noted that such
agreements might channel distribution through a select few dealers, thereby
isolating them from non-price competition."° Moreover, he concluded that if
the actual price charged nearly always approached the maximum allowable
level, the agreement tended to acquire the attributes of a minimum price fixing
scheme.'"
From such early cases as Joint Traffic and Standard Oil Co., therefore, a
clear rule arose whereby concerted activity whose only purpose or effect was to
restrain competition was unlawful on its face. Explicit in those decisions,
however, was the realization that not all agreements which adversely affected
competition could be per se illegal. 1022
 Nevertheless, the Court in each case failed
97 Id. at 152-54.
98
 Id. at 152.
99 Id. at 152-53.
100 Id. at 153.
101 Id. Justice White noted that this effect was particularly likely as the actual costs of the
dealer approached the maximum price limit. Id.
1 °2 For example, Justice Peckham in joint Traffic distinguished between agreements with
direct and indirect restraints on commerce. 171 U.S. at 568. According to Justice Peckham, the
Sherman Act did not prohibit agreements which only indirectly or unintentionally affected in-
terstate commerce. Id.; see also Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 592 (1898) (a direct and
immediate effect on competition necessary for agreement to fall within Act); Anderson v. United
States, 171 U.S. 604, 616 (1898) (if agreement is proper for purpose intended, although it in-
directly or unintentionally affects interstate commerce, it is not illegal under Sherman Act).
Chief Justice White in Standard Oil Co. recognized a distinction between: 1) agreements
which were plainly anticompetitive and therefore facially illegal without more; 2) agreements
which, although not plainly anticompetitive, were shown by all the surrounding circumstances to
be unreasonable and therefore illegal restraints of trade; and 3) agreements which did not fit into
either of the first two categories and thus did not come within the meaning of the Sherman Act.
221 U.S. at 66-68. In the same term, in United Stales v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179
(1911), Chief Justice White, again speaking for the Court, reiterated the Rule of Reason, noting:
[T]he words "restraint of trade" ... only embraced acts or contracts or agreements
or combinations which operated to the prejudice of the public interests by unduly
restricting competition or by unduly obstructing the due course of trade or which,
either because of their inherent nature or effect or because of the evident purpose of
the acts, etc., injuriously restrained trade ... [T]he statute [does] not forbid or
restrain the power to make normal and usual contracts to further trade by resorting
to all normal methods, whether by agreement or otherwise, to accomplish such pur-
pose.
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to articulate a viable theory by which combinations that restricted competition
might be spared per se condemnation.'" Moreover, despite the Court's
historical mistrust of all agreements which fix prices — as evidenced by Justice
Douglas' all-encompassing per se language in Socony-Vacuum and the Court's
subsequent adherence to that language in Kiefer-Stewart and Albrecht — there
have been circumstances in which the Court has permitted price fixing conduct
which eliminated competition.'" A consistent rationale, however, for
divergence from the strict Sacony-Vacuum per se rule is not easily articulated.'"
The most recent attempt by the Court to define the parameters of the rule
Id. at 179.
Professor Bork interpreted Chief Justice White's language in American Tobacco as a three-
part test holding an agreement unlawful if its inherent nature [a per se rule condemning cartel
agreements or "non-ancillary" restraints], or its effect or its purpose was to produce the evils of a
monopOly." Bork, Market Division, supra note 50, at 804. According to Professor Bork, if the
agreement was not on its face within a per se category, Chief Justice White's rule of reason re-
quired the trier of fact to examine the purpose of the parties or the effects of the agreement to
determine whether either was monopolistic. It
1 " See Bork, Market Division, supra note 50, at 829-30.
104 See, e.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) (combina-
tion of 137 coal producers formed and used an exclusive selling agent); Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) ("call" rule promulgated by Board which prohibited
members from purchasing or offering to purchase any "to arrive" grain during specified time
period each day at any price other than the closing bid at last call session).
LOS An early and often-cited attempt to provide a workable judicial distinction between
lawful and unlawful restrictions was made by Circuit Judge Taft in United States v. Addyston
Pipe and Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Judge Taft based his
distinction on a theory of ancillarity. He reasoned that no conventional restraint of trade could be
enforced unless the covenant underlying it was ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract.
85 F. at 282. As examples of such valid covenants in partial restraint of trade at common law,
Judge Taft listed agreements:
1) by a seller of property or business not to compete with the buyer in such a way as
to derogate from the value of the property or business sold;
2) by retiring partner not to compete with the firm;
3) by a partner pending the partnership not to do anything to interfere, by competi-
tion or otherwise, with the business of the firm;
4) by the buyer of property not to use the same in competition with the business re-
tained by the seller; and
5) by an assistant, servant or agent not to compete with the master after the expira-
tion of his time of service.
Id. at 281.
Judge Taft pointed out in each case the main purpose of the lawful agreement suggested
the extent of the allowable ancillary restraint. Where the restraint exceeded the necessity
presented by the main purpose of the contract, Judge Taft believed it should be void because: 1)
it oppressed the covenantor; and 2) it tended to create a monopoly. Id. at 282. He also noted that
where the main object of the parties to the challenged agreement was solely to restrain competi-
tion or to enhance or maintain prices, there could be no justification for the restraint. Id. at
282-83.
Today, it is clear, as Judge Taft believed it should be, that non-ancillary or "naked"
agreements which fix prices are illegal. See Bork, Market Division, supra note 50, at 800. Judge
Taft's attempt to define a category of lawful ancillary restraints, however, has not been generally
accepted by the courts. Id. According to Professor Bork, this lack of success is probably due to
Judge Taft's inability to define explicitly a main purpose which would consistently justify an an-
. ciliary elimination of competition. Id.
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against price fixing explicitly came in its 1978 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. decision.'"
4. Broadcast Music — Per Se Characterization as a Prerequisite to Per Se
Condemnation
In Broadcast Music, the Court was faced with a challenge by Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) against two licensing agencies — the
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broad-
cast Music, Inc. (BMI) — for composers, writers and publishers of musical
compositions.'" CBS alleged that the system by which the agencies set and
received fees for the issuance of blanket licenses to perform the copyrighted
compositions of their membership was per se illegal price fixing under section 1
of the Sherman Act. 108
 Although ASCAP and BMI were literally fixing the
price of a blanket license, the Court nevertheless unanimously held that the
agencies' conduct did not constitute price fixing that was per se unlawful.'"
Writing for the Court, Justice White emphasized that a literal approach to
per se analysis which simply equates the setting of a price with illegal "price fix-
ing" was not in itself sufficient to establish that a particular business practice
was either clearly anticompetitive or without redeeming value and, therefore,
illegal on its face."° Instead, he pointed out, the challenged conduct must be
characterized as within a per se category before it can be fatally labelled."' In
this regard, Justice White deemed several factors important to his conclusion
that the ASCAP-BMI blanket licenses were not per se illegal price fixing
agreements. First, he noted the novelty of the licensing arrangement, and the
Court's lack of experience with similar practices.' 12 Second, Justice White
observed that a blanket license of some type was a necessary consequence of the
integration of sales, monitoring and enforcement functions necessary to
achieve substantial market efficiencies given the large number of users and
106
 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
107 Id.
104 Ed.
Jug Id.
Id. at 9. Justice White noted that "[1]iteralness is overly simplistic and often over-
broad." Id. Justice White offered as an example the price-setting activity of two partners. Id.
Although their activity in setting a price for their goods or services is literally "price fixing," the
partners have not violated the Sherman Act per se. Id,
"' Justice White pointed out that such a characterization "will often, but not always, be
a simple matter." Id.
1 " After noting that the courts classify business relationships as per se violations only
after considerable experience with the relationship, Justice White stated that the Court had
"never examined a practice like this one before; indeed, the Court of Appeals recognized that
'kin dealing with performing rights in the music industry we confront conditions both in
copyright law and in antitrust law which are sui generis.' " Id. at 9-10 (citing United States v.
Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S.
253, 263 (1963)).
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composers of copyrighted music." 3 He pointed out that the substantial savings
in transaction costs brought about by these increased efficiencies was potential-
ly beneficial to both buyers and sellers." 4 Third, Justice White expressed
doubt about the extent to which the blanket license agreements actually
threatened "competitive pricing" in the market. 13 Stating that not all
agreements among competitors which have an impact on price are per se
illegal, 16 Justice White reasoned that the ASCAP-BM[ blanket license could
not be equated with a simple, facially illegal horizontal price fixing
agreement."' Instead, he wrote, the license was different from anything an in-
dividual copyright owner could issue and, moreover, nothing impeded CBS
from obtaining licenses on an individual basis."' Justice White concluded,
therefore, that the blanket license should not be automatically declared illegal,
but instead should be examined more closely under a Rule of Reason ap-
proach. "9
In light of per se precedent, the Court's decision in Broadcast Music was
significant in several respects. The Court clearly backed away from the uncom-
promising language of Socony- Vacuum,' 2/3 and explicitly manifested its belief that
the per se rule was not an inflexible doctrine to be automatically applied to every
agreement which literally fixed a price. Moreover, Justice White's opinion sug-
gested an unwillingness to condemn a business practice on its face when the
judiciary is unfamiliar with the economic effect of the arrangement. ' 2 ' Equally
significant, however, was the emphasis placed on the creation of cost-saving ef-
ficiencies in the market as a basis for avoiding per se liability. 122 After the
13 Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 20.
" 4 Id. at 21.
'" Id. at 23.
116 Id. As examples of such agreements, Justice White noted:
Mergers among competitors eliminate competition, including price competition,
but they are not per se illegal, and many of them withstand attack under any existing
antitrust standard. Joint ventures and other cooperative arrangements are also not
usually unlawful, at least not as price fixing schemes, where the agreement on price
is necessary to market the product at all.
Id.
'" Id.
118 Id. Justice White also pointed out that the individual composers and authors neither
agreed not to sell individually in any other market nor to use the blanket license to mask price fix-
ing in other markets. Id. at 23-24.
"g Id. at 24.
12° See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
121
 One commentator has suggested that the approach relied upon by the Broadcast Music
Court involved a balancing of the competitive injury against the competitive benefits of the
challenged practice — as under a rule of reason — with the inquiry narrowed according to the
court's familiarity with the practice. Comment, CBS v. ASCAP: Blanket Licensing and the Unresolved
Conflict Between Copyright and Antitrust Law, 13 CONN. L. REV. 465, 506 (1981); see also, Comment,
Price Fixing and the Per Se Rule; A Redefinition Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems,
Inc., 5 DEL. J. CORP. L. 73, 93 (1980) (Per se rule not used because Court had not analyzed li-
censing system in the past).
822
 Several commentators have suggested that visibility of efficiency creating potential is
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Court's decision in Broadcast Music, " naked" price restraints — those restraints
whose sole purpose or effect was to restrain competition — clearly remained per
se illegal, without the need for additional inquiry under the Rule of Reason.'"
Yet, as a result of the rationale in Broadcast Music, it also appeared that the
Court would adopt a more inquiring and flexible approach to per se analysis
when the challenged practice did not plainly threaten competitive pricing and
where the practice, although effecting a price, was novel and held the promise
of attaining significant, otherwise unattainable economic efficiencies.I 24
in fact a viable basis on which the Court has in the past distinguished between "naked" — and
therefore per se illegal restraints of trade — and similar agreements, which although affecting
competition, are generally not held to be per se illegal. See, e.g., L. SULLIVAN, supra note 25, S 77,
at 206-10; Bork, Market Division, supra note 50, 830-32; Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Con-
cept: Price Fixing and Market Division (II), 75 YALE L. J. 373, 384 (1966) (hereinafter cited as Bork,
Price Fixing).
For example, Professor Bork has suggested that the earliest Court interpretations of the
Sherman Act by Chief Justice White and Justices Peckham and Taft, although couched in terms
of preservation of competition, displayed concern that the law not condemn efficient forms of
combination, but only those whose sole effect was elimination of competition. Bork, Price Fixing,
supra note 122, at 375 n.2. He notes that absent a concern for efficiency creating potential, there
remains no other value which would suggest a basis for greater judicial tolerance for mergers and
other such competition destroying combinations as compared with the judicially feared cartel
agreements. Bork, Market Division, supra note 50, at 830 n.176, 177.
In fact, Bork attributes the Court's inability to describe the contours of the per se rule
satisfatorily to its failure to define the scope of the rule in terms of promoting "consumer wealth"
or "consumer want satisfaction." Bork, Price Fixing, supra note 122, at 378. Bork uses these terms
broadly to describe the net effect of an agreement's opposing tendencies — efficiency and restric-
tion of output. Id. at 375 n.2. Since neither factor can be given a quantitative value, he suggests
that the possible presence of efficiency is to be inferred from the presence of integration of pro-
ductive activities, while the presence of restriction of output is to be inferred from a large market
size. Id. at 386 n.32, 33. According to Bork, in each case before the court a rough balance should
be struck between the two with some integration (efficiency potential) required below a certain
market percentage as a prerequisite to the validity of elimination of any competition. Id. at 386
n.33.
A simple example of the interaction of efficiency and integration is the partnership. Both
Justice Peckham in Joint Traffic, 171 U.S. at 567, and Judge Taft in Addyston Pipe and Steel, 85 F.
at 281, recognized a partnership agreement as a lawful restriction of competition in the
marketplace. Judge Taft found the arrangement lawful because any reduction in competition
was incident to a union of the excompetitor's "capital, enterprise, and energy to carry on a suc-
cessful business." Addyston Pipe and Steel, 85 F. at 280. Similarly, Professor Bork would argue that
the reduction in competition (setting of prices for goods or services) is lawfully subordinate or an-
cillary to the creation of new market efficiencies based upon an integration of the new partners'
productive efforts. Bork, Price Fixing, supra note 122, at 380-84.
123 See, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980). Catalano involved
an agreement among wholesalers to eliminate short-term credit formerly granted to beer retailers
and to require future payments in cash. Id. at 644. In a per curium opinion, the Court held that
"[a]n agreement to terminate the practice of giving credit is thus tantamount to an agreement to
eliminate discounts, and thus falls squarely within the traditional per se rule against price fixing."
Id. at 648. The Court agreed with the appeals court's dissent which characterized the practice as
"plainly anticompetitive," id. at 645.46, and noted that the wholesaler's concerted activity en-
tailed a clear risk of anticompetitive impact with "no apparent potentially redeeming value." Id.
at 649.
124 See generally Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 886, 901 (1981).
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B. Judicial Treatment of Anticompetitive Professional Agreements — An Implied
Exemption from Traditional Per Se Analysis?
In Broadcast Music, the Supreme Court defined and clarified the proper
scope of judicial inquiry incident to a per se price fixing analysis. ' 25 Yet Broadcast
Music, Socony-Vacuum, Albrecht and the majority of other cases around which the
present-day bifurcated antitrust approach arose were argued and decided in
the context of entirely commercial enterprises and markets. In light of these
.precedents, therefore, it remained unclear whether the involvement of "profes-
sionals," such as physicians, as parties to a challenged agreement would in-
fluence in any way the level of judicial antitrust scrutiny — particularly when
the professional activity was deemed plainly anticompetitive by the court. Prior
to the Court's decision in Maricopa County, it was arguable that the Court had
never explicitly characterized such challenged professional conduct as within a
per se category, despite several opportunities to do so.'" The Court's reluctance
to apply traditional per se standards seemed predicated on a historical belief that
in certain instances a commercially developed standard of competition was not
compatible with professional notions of self-regulation, public service and
ethical conduct. Indeed, since the passage of the Sherman Act, the professions
have 'consistently been treated more leniently than commercial businesses by
the courts.'" This special treatment was originally termed the "learned profes-
sion" exemption and arose primarily from the language of the statute and the
judicially-perceived uniqueness of professional activities.'" To better under-
stand the extent of this "exemption" and its impact on the Maricopa County
decisions, however, it is again instructive to briefly trace its early development
and later modification by the Court.
The Sherman Act prohibits all restraints of trade or commerce between
the states.'" Based primarily on several early decisions holding that the prac-
tice of a profession was neither a trade nor a subject of commerce, however,
professionals successfully argued that their activities did not fall within the
meaning of the Act.'" The Court's early refusal to classify professional services
125 See supra notes 110-124 and accompanying text.
126 See infra notes 138-60 and accompanying text.
127 See generally Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 13-15 (4th Cir. 1974).
128 Id. at 13.
I" 15 U.S.C. 5 1 (1976).
"° In The Nymph, Justice Story first formulated a distinction between the trade and com-
merce of a business and the public service goals of professionals. 18 F. Cas. 506 (C.C.D. Me.
1834). Reasoning that professionals were not engaged in trade or commerce because their goal
was public service and not profit, Justice Story noted that lw[herever any occupation, employ-
ment or business is carried on for the purpose of profit, or gain, or a livelihood, not in the liberal
arts or in the learned professions, it is constantly called a trade." Id. at 507 (emphasis added).
This distinction formed a basis for the so-called "learned profession" exemption. It was
given further credence by Justice Sutherland in Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, when
he quoted Justice Story's distinction with favor in interpretating the phrase "restraint of trade"
as used in 3 of the Sherman Act. 286 U.S. 427, 435-36 (1932); see also, Federal Trade Comm'n
July 1983]	 CASENOTES	 1107
as "trade or commerce" appeared to be premised on the belief that, in certain
instances, competition was not consistent with the ethical and public service
mandates of professional activity."' For example, in United States v. Oregon State
Medical Society,' 32 the Court affirmed a federal district court's decision that the
practice of medicine wholly within the state by physicians of the state was not
"trade or commerce" within the meaning of section 1 of the Sherman Act.' 33
Writing for the majority, Justice Jackson distinguished the ethical considera-
tions inherent in the doctor-patient relationship from the more general business
considerations prevalent in ordinary commercial matters.' 34
 He concluded that
"forms of competition usual in the business world may be demoralizing to the
ethical standards of a profession. '""
Yet as initially applied by the courts, the "learned profession" exemption
was limited in scope. For example, the exemption applied only to those
restraints which operated directly on the profession and were deemed to be
associated with the public service and ethical norms of the profession.'" It did
not protect professional agreements that restrained trade outside of the profes-
sion and which directly affected interstate commerce.'"
More recently, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,'" the Supreme Court even
further narrowed the scope of the exemption. Writing for the Court, Chief
Justice Burger rejected the notion that a "learned profession" exemption ex-
isted based upon the incompatibility of certain competitive practices with pro-
fessional regulation.'" Thus, the Goldfarb Court held that a fee schedule
v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931) (professional activities not a trade); Federal Baseball
Club, Inc. v. Nat'l League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922) (personal ef-
fort, not related to production, also not a subject of commerce); Riggall v. Washington County
Medical Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266, 268 (8th Cir. 1957) (practice of plaintiff's profession as disclosed in
allegations of complaint is neither trade nor commerce within the meaning of $ 1 of the Sherman
Act).
1 " As the appeals court in Goldfarb noted:
The legal profession has rejected the maxim of caveat employ as a standard of conduct.
Unlike the mechanic or the butcher, a lawyer has a professional duty to provide his
services at a reduced rate to those who need but cannot afford his services. Advertis-
ing and other forms of solicitation of business common to trade and commerce are
criminal acts when utilized by lawyers. In view of the special form of regulation
already imposed upon those in the legal profession the courts have been reluctant to
superimpose upon the profession the sanctions of the antitrust laws, many of which
are in direct contravention of existing legal and ethical restrictions.
497 F.2d at 14.
12
 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
133
 Id. at 338-39.
134
 Specifically, Justice Jackson stated that "there are ethical considerations where the
historic direct relationship between patient and physician is involved which are quite different
than the usual considerations prevailing in ordinary commercial matters." Id. at 336.
1 " Id.
"6 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 11, 15 (4th Cir. 1974).
'" Id.
"a 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
"9 Id. at 787. The Court reversed the appeals court decision holding the defendant State
Bar exempt from antitrust scrutiny as "learned profession." Id. at 793. Noting that the appeals
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published by the county bar association which prescribed a minimum fee for
title examinations was illegal price fixing."° The bar association defended
its activities primarily on the ground that its members belonged to one of the
"learned professions," and since competition was not consistent with the pro-
fessional goal of providing necessary community service, the antitrust laws did
not apply. 141 Dismissing the association's argument, the Chief Justice noted
that in determining whether section 1 of the Act included professionals neither
the nature of an occupation, standing alone,. nor the public service aspect of
professional activities was controlling."' He pointed out that in the instant
case, the exchange of money for a title examination was clearly commerce and
that it could not be disputed that the activities of lawyers "played an important
part in commercial intercourse.' '' 43 The Chief Justice therefore concluded that
anticompetitive activities by lawyers — and presumably other professionals —
might restrain commerce within the meaning of section 1 of the Sherman
Act.'"
Chief Justice Burger appeared to soften the impact of his decision,
however, by suggesting in a footnote that the decision was limited to its facts
and that something other than traditional competition-oriented antitrust stand-
ards might still apply to professional restraints by virtue of the public service
aspects and other unidentified features of the professions.' 45 Moreover,
although the Chief Justice found that the minimum fee schedules utilized by
the bar association constituted a classic example of price fixing, he nevertheless
failed to characterize explicitly the conduct as per se illegal.'" The result of this
court premised this exemption upon the incompatibility of certain competitive practices with pro-
fessional regulation by the state, Chief Justice Burger reasoned that "[w]hether state regulation
is active or dormant, real or theoretical, lawyers would be able to adopt anticompetitive practices
with impunity." Id. at 787.
740 Id. at 781-83.
"' Id. at 786. The Bar also argued that 1) the effect on interstate commerce caused by
the fee schedule was incidental and remote, id. at 783; and 2) their activity was "state action."
Id. at 788.
142 Id. at 787. Instead, he noted that "Congress intended to strike as broadly as it could
in S 1 of the Sherman Act, and to read into it so wide an exemption as that urged on us would be
at odds with that purpose." Id.
' 4 ' Id. at 787-88.
' 44 Id. at 788.
145 Id. at 787-88 n.17. In this much-scrutinized footnote, Chief justice Burger stated:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business
is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the
Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as inter-
changeable with other business activities, and automatically to apply to the profes-
sions concepts which originated in other areas. The public service aspect, and other
features of the professions, may require that a particular practice, which could be
properly viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated dif-
ferently. We intimate no view on any other situation than the one with which we are
confronted today.
Id.
144 Id. at 783.
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ambiguity was confusion among lower courts' 47
 and commentators alike.' 48
Several years later, in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 149
the Court attempted to clarify the scope of its cautionary footnote in Goldfarb.
Speaking for the Court, Justice Stevens determined that a professional canon
of ethics preventing competitive bidding for engineering services violated sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act.' 5° The engineers argued that their canon was
justified under the Rule of Reason because the practice of awarding contracts
to the lowest bidder would jeopardize the public health and safety by tempting
some engineers to produce a low-cost, potentially defective product.'" Reject-
ing this argument, Justice Stevens reasoned that the absolute prohibition
unreasonably restrained price competition by preventing customers from com-
paring prices in the marketplace. 152
 Justice Stevens purported to adhere to the
view expressed in the Goldfarb footnote that the nature of competition in profes-
sional services might vary from that of other business services) 53 He conclud-
ed, however, that while ethical norms may serve to regulate and promote pro-
fessional competition, the fact that such competition is not entirely conducive
to ethical behavior is not a recognizable reason under the Sherman Act to
eliminate it completely.'"
14 ' Compare United States v. Texas State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy, 464 F. Supp. 400,
403 (W.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd and modified per curium, 592 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 444 U.S.
925 (1979) (per se rules apply to professionals) and American Medical Ass'n, 94 FTC 701,
1014-15 (1979), aff'd sub nom. American Medical Ass'n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980),
aff'd by an equally divided court, 456 U.S. 901 (1982) (same) with Virginia Academy of Clinical
Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 624 F.2d 476, 484-85 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. dented; 450 U.S. 916
(1980) (per se rule inapplicable to professionals), and Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n,
549 F.2d 626, 630-32 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977) (per se rule for commercial
goals and rule of reason for professional or non-commercial goals). See generally Michaelson &
McDavid, Maricopa County Ruling Unsettles the Law on Professional Activities, NAT'L. L. J., July 19,
1982, at 22, col. 1.
1411 Compare Price-Fixing, Advertising Bans and other Self-Regulation by Lawyers: What Future
Under Antitrust Laws?, 12 COLUM. J.L. SOC. PROB. 531, 538-40 (1976) (Goldfarb did not use per se
analysis) and Martyn, Lawyer Advertising: The Unique Relationship Between First Amendment and An-
titrust Protections, 23 WAYNE L. REV. 167, 183 (1976) (same) with Branca & Steinberg, Attorney Fee
Schedules and Legal Advertising: The Implications of Goldfarb, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 475, 507 (1977)
(Goldfarb used per se rule) and Comment, Antitrust—Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar—Professional Legal
Services Are Held To Be Within The Ambit Of Federal Antitrust Laws, 7 LOYOLA U. L. J. (Chicago)
254, 261-62 (1976) (same).
149 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
' 5° Id. at 693. The Court noted that after compiling a "voluminous" discovery and trial
record, the district court had concluded that the ethical prohibition was "on its face a tampering
with the price structure of engineering fees in violation of 1 of the Sherman Act." Id. at 685-86.
13'
	 684-85.
'" Id. at 692-93. Justice Stevens also noted that the "Society's affirmative defense con-
firms rather than refutes the anticompetitive purpose and effect of its agreement." Id. at 693.
'" Id. at 696.
154 Id. Addressing the Society's contention that a ban on competitive bidding was
necessary to prevent engineers from submitting deceptively low bids, Justice Stevens reasoned
that the equation of competition with deception, like a similar equation with safety hazards, was
too broad. Id.
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Although Justice Stevens emphasized the plainly anticompetitive
character of the restrictive canon in Professional Engineers, it was unclear whether
the Court had in fact determined the ban on competitive bidding to be illegal
per se.'" Predictably, the result of this lack of clarity was confusion about which
approach — Rule of Reason or per se — had been applied, and whether and
when per se rules were properly applicable to professional agreements.'"
Nevertheless, despite the ambiguous analysis in both Goldfarb and Professional
Engineers, the decisions may be read as holding that professionals such as physi-
cians could no longer continue to justify clear restraints on competition
simply by invoking a "public service" or "ethical necessity" argument.'" In-
deed, it appeared that the physicians in Maricopa County could expect to be held
to the same economic standards as other business entities, especially if the pur-
pose or effect of the challenged activity was deemed to be plainly anticompe-
titive. 158
Confusion over the correct judicial standard of review for professional
agreements whose anticompetitive purpose or effect is not palpably apparent
was reflected in both lower court opinions in Maricopa Counly.m The Supreme
Court's decision in Maricopa County not to afford the physician-respondents
special "professional" antitrust status, however, was neither surprising nor
necessarily inconsistent with Goldfarb or Professional Engineers, once the majority
determined that the FMC fee reimbursement schedules were plainly anticom-
petitive price fixing arrangements.' 5° The threshold issue facing the Maricopa
County Court, therefore, was whether under Broadcast Music such a per se
characterization was proper given the state of the record, the novelty of the
FMC plan and the apparent economic efficiencies associated with its operation
in the health care system."' The remainder of this casenote will address prin-
cipally that issue and its resolution.
"5 Justice Stevens held that "[O]n its face, this agreement restrains trade within the
meaning of I of the Sherman Act." Id. at 693.
"6 See, e.g., Havighurst, supra note 3, at 348 n.194 (Professional Engineers employed a per se
rule); Allison, Ambiguous Price Fixing and the Sherman Act: Simplistic Labels or Unavoidable Analysis?, 16
Hous. L. REV. 761, 822 (1979) (Rule of Reason); Sullivan, Recent Antitrust Developments: Defining
the Scope of Exemptions, Expanding Coverage, and Refining the Rule of Reason, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV,
265, 323 (1979) (Rule of Reason). See generally Michaelson & McDavid, supra note 147, at 22, col.
1.
In his dissenting opinion in Maricopa County, however, Justice Powell noted that Profes-
sional Engineers was a per se case. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466,
2483 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
1 " See generally Shapiro, supra note 3, at 426-28.
18 See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 699
(1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (Court intimates that
any ethical rule with an overall anticompetitive effect is forbidden under Sherman Act); Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786-87 (1975) (classic "professional" defense loses some
force when used to support anticompetitive fee control activities).
18 See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
160 See infra notes 162-192 and accompanying text.
161
 See supra notes 110-124 and accompanying text.
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II. THE HOLDING IN MARICOPA COUNTY
On review by certiorari, 162 the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts'
denial of the State of Arizona's motion for partial summary judgment on the
issue of per se liability."' In a 4-3 decision written by Justice Stevens, the Court
held that the FMC maximum reimbursement agreements, between member
physicians and third party insurance payors, constituted per se illegal price fix-
ing under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 164
Justice Stevens prefaced his analysis by pointing out that the Court in the
past had consistently held that once a price fixing agreement was proved, no
showing of competitive abuses or other evils which such an agreement was
designed to protect against or eliminate could be interposed as a defense."'
Nevertheless, Justice Stevens addressed himself to each of the foundations'
arguments. t66 First, he noted that the maximum reimbursement agreements
did not escape per se condemnation because they were horizontal and fixed
maximum prices. 167 Justice Stevens explained that Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram
& Sons' and Albrecht v. Herald Co. 1 6 9 placed horizontal maximum price fixing
agreements on "the same legal — even if not economic — footing as agree-
ments to fix minimum or uniform prices.'"" Justice Stevens concluded that in
'" Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 450 U.S. 979 (1981).
'" Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466-80 (1982). In a brief
Memorandum and Order, the district court in Maricopa County denied the state's motion for par-
tial summary judgment and held that a Rule of Reason and not a per se approach was the ap-
propriate judicial analysis. Maricopa County, 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH), at 77,897. The Ninth
Circuit, in a divided panel, affirmed the district court's order. Maricopa County, 643 F.2d at 554.
164 Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2466-80.
165 Id. at 2473-74 (quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218
(1940)). Subsequently, Justice Stevens noted that the application of the per se rule to maximum
price fixing agreements in Kiefer-Stewart, Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211
(1951), and later in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), followed "ineluctably" from
Socony- Vacuum. Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2474.
Justice Harlan, dissenting in Albrecht, would undoubtedly have disagreed with such an
assertion. 390 U.S. at 156-68 (Harlan, J., dissenting), He distinguished the economic impact of
price floors from price ceilings. Id. at 156. Justice Harlan reaEoned that price floors (minimum
prices) are held to be per se unreasonable because they inevitably lessen competition. Id. at 159 &
n.3. But resale (vertical) price ceilings (maximum prices), according to Justice Harlan, are a dif-
ferent matter because they do not tend to lessen competition. Id. at 159 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
He concluded, therefore, that "in a maximum price case the asserted justification must be met
on its merits, and not by incantations of a per se rule developed for an altogether different situa-
tion." Id.; see also Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 168-70 (Stewart, J., dissenting); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 158-59 (1976).
166 Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2475-80.
"? Id. at 2475.
'" 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
l" 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
179 Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2475. Even assuming that there was a viable economic
basis for extending the per se rule against price fixing to include the maximum resale agreements
in Kiefer-Stewart and Albrecht, it was unreasonable of Justice Stevens not to distinguish here be-
tween the legal and economic antitrust consequences of business arrangements which have been
shown by judicial experience to stifle competition, and those arrangements which the Court has
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the case of the FMC agreements, the per se rule was violated by a price restraint
that "tencl[ed] to provide the same economic rewards to all practitioners
regardless of their skill, their experience, their training, or their willingness to
employ innovative and difficult procedures in individual cases." 171
Next, the Maricopa County majority held that the fact that physicians, rather
than non-professionals, were parties to the price fixing agreement made no dif-
ference to its per se analysis.' 72
 Justice Stevens noted that, unlike the profes-
sional agreements in Goldfarb and Professional Engineers, the justifications for the
maximum reimbursement agreements were not premised on public service,
ethical norms, or improved quality of professional services, but simply on the
"successful marketing of an attractive insurance plan."'" justice Stevens con-
cluded that such a justification did not distinguish the medical profession from
any other commercial enterprise. 174
The majority was also unpersuaded by the argument that the per se rules
should not apply because the judiciary had little antitrust experience in the
never before evaluated and which arguably enhance competition or reduce consumer costs
through creation of substantial efficiencies. Perhaps Justice Stevens was implying that his ap-
plication of the per se rule in Maricopa County to what he defined as a horizontal maximum price fix-
ing agreement followed "ineluctably" from Kiefer-Stewart and Albrecht. He conceded, however,
that both those cases involved vertical arrangements in which maximum resale prices were fixed.
Id. at 2475 n.18. Justice Stevens nevertheless hastily concluded, that, "Nil any event, horizontal
restraints are generally less defensible than vertical restraints." Id.
For this final proposition, Justice Stevens cites Easterbrook, supra note 124, at 890 n.20.
Professor Easterbrook argued there, however, that because of the "laconic" and "shallow" anti-
trust reasoning employed by the Court in both Kiefer-Stewart and Albrecht, neither should be con-
trolling in maximum price fixing cases. Id. at 888-89. He concluded that, as mandated by the
Broadcast Music standard, the "Court never has attempted to determine whether maximum price
fixing almost always would tend to restrict competition and decrease output or increase economic
efficiency instead." Id. at 890 (quoting Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979)); MC also, Blair & Kaserman, supra note 88, at 482 (Supreme Court
in Albrecht insisted upon mechanical application of per se rule against price fixing despite evidence
of beneficial economic effects).
Also, neither the district court nor the circuit court in Maricopa County held Kiefer-Stewart
or Albrecht to be controlling. The district court found that neither case need be read as per se
holdings condemning maximum price fixing. Markopa County [1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH), at
77,896. The court cited with approval Professor Kallstrom's comment that, unlike most per se
cases, Kiefer-Stewart and Albrecht were not the culmination of a long line of rulings establishing that
the practice was almost always anticompetitive, nor did the decisions discuss the possible benefits
and detriments to competition and efficiency so as to conclude that virtually no defense would be
successful. Id. (quoting, Kallstrom, supra note 3, at 666-68). The Ninth Circuit simply noted that
it had not extended either ruling to horizontal agreements establishing maximum prices. Maricopa
County, 643 F.2d at 557 n.4.
'" Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2475. Justice Stevens also reasoned that the FMC re-
straint "may discourage entry into the market and may deter experimentation and new develop-
ments by individual entrepreneurs. It may be a masquerade for an agreement to fix uniform
prices or it may in the future take on that character." Id. (emphasis added).
"2 Id.
'" Id. at 2475-76.
"4 Id. at 2476. Both the district court and the circuit court held, however, that the fact
that a profession was involved was one important factor in its determination that a Rule of
Reason rather than a per se approach was inappropriate in Maricopa County.
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health care industry. 15 Justice Stevens noted that the Sherman Act establishes
one uniform price fixing rule applicable to all industries alike." 6 Thus, he
pointed out, a contrary argument offered by the foundations ignored the ra-
tionale behind the per se rules which is, Justice Stevens asserted, in part,'"
avoidance of prolonged judicial investigation of the entire history of the in-
dustry involved."s
Turning to the foundations' assertion that the challenged arrangement's
procompetitive nature should preclude per se condemnation,"g Justice Stevens
The district court, citing Goldfarb and Professional Engineers as well as the Ninth Circuit's
previous decision in Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626, 632 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977), concluded that a Rule of Reason approach was to be applied when
analyzing professional practices alleged to be in violation of the antitrust laws. Maricopa Courtly,
[1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH), at 78,896-97. The district court's reasoning seemed premised on
the notion that absent long judicial antitrust experience with professional activities, per se rules
developed in a commercial context should not be automatically applied to professionals. Id.
Similarly, Judge Sneed, writing for the circuit court, interpreted Professional Engineers as recogniz-
ing that marketing restraints which regulate professional competition may lawfully serve the
public even though their use in a purely commercial setting would violate the antitrust law.
Maricopa County, 643 F.2d at 560. He believed it was sufficiently probable that the FMC
agreements were sheltered by such a principle to justify his refusal to label them as per se illegal.
Id.
Assuming, however, that Justice Stevens concluded that the anticompetitive purpose or
effect of the FMC agreements was obvious, his reasoning seems most consistent with the
language and general tone of the Goldfarb and Professional Engineers decisions. See generally supra
notes 126-160 and accompanying text.
'" Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2476.
76 Id. (quoting, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Co., 310 U.S. 150, 222 (1940)).
1 " In addition to considerations of efficiency and certainty, Justice Stevens noted that
the per se rule is grounded on a recognition of the respective roles that the judiciary and Congress
play in regulating the economy. Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2478. Justice Stevens commented
that by articulating antitrust rules with clarity and by adhering to rules justified in their general
application, the Court has enhanced the legislative prerogative to amend the law. Id. He conclud-
ed that the foundation's arguments against application of the per se rule would therefore be better
directed to the legislative branch, since Congress might consider a particular exception that the
Court was not free to read into the statute. Id. at 2478-79.
In his dissent, Justice Powell reasoned that this was "curious advice" since it has always
been the courts' duty to interpret and apply the mandate of the Sherman Act. Id. at 2484 (Powell,
J., dissenting).
Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2476-77 (quoting, Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)). Justice Stevens noted that the appeals court refused to apply the per se rule
in part because the health care industry was far removed from a perfect competitive model and as
a result adopted an improper legal standard based on the reasonableness of the fixed prices.
Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2476.
Justice Stevens was referring in particular to Judge Sneed's belief that when confronted
with an industry widely deviant from a reasonably free competitive model, the proper inquiry is
whether the practice enhances the prices charged for services. 643 F.2d 556-57. Judge Sneed's
emphasis here possibly is misplaced, but his apparent equation of increased prices with anticom-
petitive impact seems to stem primarily from his inability, based on the limited record, to identify
a factual baseline from which to determine competitive purpose or effect. Id. See infra note 212,
229. But see, Easterbrook, supra note 124, at 900-901.
19 The foundations argued that their activities were procompetitive because they en-
abled the FMC's to provide health care consumers with a unique insurance product which could
not exist unless the foundations themselves established the maximum levels of reimbursement.
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stated that such an argument "indicated a misunderstanding of the per se con-
cept [because] [t]he anticompetitive potential inherent in all price fixing
agreements justifies their facial invalidation even if procompetitive justifica-
tions are offered for some."'" Reviewing the foundations' claim that the FMC
insurance plans made possible a unique form of health coverage of which the
maximum reimbursement schedules were an essential part, the majority con-
cluded that despite giving every favorable inference to the foundations, the
limited record was not inconsistent with a presumption that the FMC
agreements did not significantly enhance competition. 1 e' To this end, Justice
Stevens noted that at least two of the features of the FMC plans stressed by the
respondent foundations — choice of doctors and complete insurance coverage
— were not necessarily unique.'" He reasoned that at least an equal percen-
tage of non-FMC physicians in other comparable markets would charge a pa-
tient no more than the "tisual, customary and reasonable" fee that insurers are
typically willing to reimburse in full.' 83 Justice Stevens further reasoned that
even if a fee schedule were desirable,'" it was not necessary that physicians
determine reimbursement levels, since insurers themselves are capable of set
ting maximum reimbursable prices as well as obtaining binding agreements
with health care providers guaranteeing full reimbursement.'" Justice Stevens
concluded by noting that despite an "assumption" that physicians could set re-
imbursement levels more efficiently than insurers,'" any savings which might
accrue therefrom would not be sufficiently great to affect the competitiveness of
the FMC-type insurance plan in the market.'"
Finally, the majority addressed the foundations' argument that the maxi-
mum reimbursement schedules — although literally fixing prices for medical
services — did not fall within the ambit of those practices previously held by
the Court to be illegal under the per se rule against price fixing.'" Although
The result, according to the foundations, was a demonstrable reduction in the cost of premiums
for FMC-endorsed health insurance with no effect on prices charged by physicians to their pa-
tients. Brief for Respondents at 23, 43-44.
"° Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2477.
181 Id.
' 82 Id.
183 Id.
I" Justice Stevens conceded that a binding assurance of 100% coverage, as well as the
potential for reduced insurance premiums, could only be obtained if the physician and insurer
agreed in advance on the maximum amount to be reimbursed for any particular health care serv-
ice. Id.
1 " Id. at 2477-78.
Hic Justice Stevens termed such an assumption "far from obvious." Id. at 2478.
187 Id. Justice Stevens reasoned that the foundations' actual or potential market power to
dictate the terms of the insurance plans might offset the asserted efficiencies associated with the
FMC arrangements. Id. He noted that "[i]n this case it appears that the fees are set by a group
with substantial power in the market for medical services, and that there is competition among
insurance companies in the sale of medical insurance. Under these circumstances the insurance
companies are not likely to have significantly greater bargaining power against a monopoly of
doctors than would individual consumers of medical services." Id. at 2478 n.29.
168 Id. at 2479. Although Justice Stevens addresses this issue of per se characterization at
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Justice Stevens did not elucidate the standard by which he presumably
characterized the FMC agreement to be within the per se illegal category, he
nevertheless noted that the foundations' reliance on the Court's rationale in
Broadcast Music' 89 was unfounded, because the cases were "fundamentally dif-
ferent."'" Distinguishing Broadcast Music on its facts, Justice Stevens reasoned
that in Maricopa County the physicians' concerted activities did not allow them
to sell a "different product" as in Broadcast Music, but instead merely permitted
them to sell their individual services to certain insured customers at fixed prices
and, arguably, to affect the market price for such medical care. 19 ' He conclud-
ed that, unlike a legal partnership arrangement, the FMC fee agreements were
among individual competing medical entrepreneurs and as such fit directly into
the horizontal price fixing mold.' 92
Justice Powell, writing for the dissent, questioned the majority's basis for
characterizing the agreements as per se illegal price fixing, and assailed Justice
Stevens' conclusion that such a violation existed inasmuch as that conclusion
was necessarily premised on an incomplete summary judgment record.'"
Justice Powell began his discussion by pointing out that while it is well settled
that once an agreement is labelled price fixing it is per se illegal, it is equally set-
tled that such a characterization is not to be automatically applied to every ar-
rangement which literally fixes a price.'" He therefore noted that only if it was
the end of his analysis, it would seem more appropriately dealt with as a threshold inquiry since
all of his previous arguments apparently start from the premise that the FMC reimbursement
schedules do in fact fit within the category of those practices traditionally held to be per se illegal
price fixing.
1" 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
1 " Maricopa County, 102 U.S. at 2479.
' 9 ' Id.
192 Id. at 2479-80. Justice Stevens thus distinguished the FMC arrangements from
"partnerships or other joint arrangements in which persons who would otherwise be competitors
pool their capital and share the risks of loss as well as opportunities for profit." Id.
' 95
 Id. at 2480-85 (Powell, J., dissenting). Noting that inferences drawn from the sum-
mary judgment record must be viewed in light most favorable to the respondent foundations,
Justice Powell premised his discussion by pointing out that the Court was thus required to con-
clude that the FMC plans served as an effective cost containment mechanism that had saved con-
sumers millions of dollars. Id. at 2481. He further asserted that the Court had failed to stress
several other significant aspects of the record. First, Justice Powell argued that the record dis-
closed that the foundation arrangments foreclosed no competition because — unlike the classic
cartel arrangement — participating physicians and insurers were free to engage in price competi-
tion outside the plan. Id. Nor, he noted, were physicians locked into a plan for more than a one-
year term of membership. Id. Second, Justice Powell contended that on the record the Court
must find that insurers represent consumer interests. Id. This is so, he reasoned, because, unlike
most health care consumers, insurers have a profit incentive to keep insurance premiums at a
competitive level and thereby contain medical costs. Id. at 2481-82. Finally, Justice Powell
argued that, as the record indicated no opposition to the FMC plan by either insurers or con-
sumers, the Court must infer that it had benefited consumers by allowing insurers to limit and
more efficiently calculate the risks they underwrite. Id. at 2482. Justice Powell concluded that,
although the case was before the Court on an incomplete summary judgment record, the majori-
ty nevertheless had conclusively drawn contrary inferences to support its per se judgment. Id.
194 Id. (citing Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9
(1979)).
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clear from the • record that the agreement among the FMC physicians was
plainly anticompetitive should the Court have made a per se judgment.'"
Justice Powell explained that the fatal per se label should not be affixed,
however, without first carefully considering whether there are substantial and
realizable procompetitive economies associated with the challenged arrange-
ment.'" This is especially true, he indicated, when the challenged practice —
such as the FMC insurance plan — is a novel one.'" Thus, Justice Powell
argued that, under the rationale of Broadcast Music, if an initial judicial inquiry
reveals that the agreement achieves such proconsumer economies, per se con-
demnation is inappropriate despite literal fixing of prices among potential com-
petitors.'"
Justice Powell concluded the dissenting opinion by noting that the majori-
ty's attempt to distinguish Broadcast Music was unconvincing.' 99 He pointed out
that the non-per se illegal blanket license agreements in Broadcast Music and the
reimbursement agreements in Maricopa County were similar in several impor-
tant respects. 20° First, Justice Powell noted that both arrangements involved
potential competitors engaged in cooperative pricing."' Next, he observed that
each agreement was formed in response to the need for better service to con-
sumers. 202 Finally, Justice Powell pointed out that each agreement apparently
created a new product by attaining otherwise unattainable efficiencies."'
Justice Powell thus reasoned that, as in Broadcast Music, the plaintiff in Maricopa
County had not yet met its burden of proving that the respondent foundations
had entered into plainly anticompetitive agreements without a substantial pro-
competitive efficiency justification. 204 In the absence of such proof, Justice
Powell concluded that it was impossible to make a final judgment as to the per se
invalidity of the FMC maximum reimbursement agreements.'"
III. A CRITIQUE OF MARICOPA COUNTY
Traditionally, under the per se rules, any arrangement among competitors
having the purpose or effect of stifling price competition is illegal as a matter of
198 Id. at 2482, 2483 (citing National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 692 (1978)).
198 Id
197 Id. at 2483 (citing Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441
U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979); United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc. 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972)).
198 Id. at 2483-84.
199 Id. at 2484.
200 Id.
"I Id.
282 Id.
283 Id.
204 Id. at 2485. Justice Powell reasoned, therefore, that a critical and disputed issue of
fact remained unresolved and summary judgment accordingly was inappropriate under FED, R.
Clv. P. 56(c). Id.
2°5 Id.
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law. 206 The most obvious such restraint is a "naked" price fixing agreement."'
And, indeed, as cases such as Socony- Vacuum and Broadcast Music both indicate,
the judiciary has consistently held that once a price fixing agreement is proved,
the broad scope of inquiry required under the Rule of Reason approach is
deemed unnecessary, and additional proof of any benefits allegedly associated
with the agreement becomes irrelevant. 2" In this respect, then, the majority's
approach in Maricopa County was at least semantically consistent: The EMC
plan "fixed" maximum reimbursement "prices" for physician members'
services; maximum "price fixing" is illegal per se; the FMC plans, therefore,
must also be illegal per se. Such an approach, however, ignores a fundamental
requirement of proof incident to a proper per se characterization in this case —
proof that the purpose or effect of the FMC agreements was simply to stifle
competition within the health care market."' Moreover, in its apparent haste
to dispose of the matter, the Maricopa County Court inexplicably neither gave its
basis for characterizing the maximum reimbursement agreements as per se il-
legal nor enunciated alternative criteria by which such a characterization might
be avoided in the future."°
The Court thus missed an deal factual opportunity to resolve analytically
the obvious confusion which continues to surround the bifurcated per se-Rule of
Reason approach to antitrust enforcement. 211 It is submitted that the result of
the Maricopa County Court's unexplained and inflexible per se judgment was the
premature dismissal of a novel arrangement with visible, potentially substan-
tial proconsumer efficiency justifications. Moreover, the majority acted upon a
record which both lower courts deemed too sparse to show either the anticom-
petitive purpose or effect of the challenged reimbursement agreements. 212 This
206
	 e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1,
19-20 (1979); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
2° 7 Professor Sullivan describes such an agreement as "unvarnished" price fixing, and
defines it as one where the anticompetitive purpose and effect are self-evident. L. SULLIVAN,
supra note 25, 74, at 199-200.
28" See supra notes 77-124 and accompanying text.
2" See generally Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1,
9, 19-20 (1979).
710 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2483-84 (1982)
(Powell, J., dissenting). Given the majority's substantial reliance on the sweeping language of
Socony- Vacuum and the later cases of Kiefer-Stewart and Albrecht to the almost complete exclusion of
the Court's more recent decision in Broadcast Music, however, its perfunctory condemnation of
the FMC agreements, although unfortunate, was somewhat predictable. See supra notes 165-71
and accompanying text.
" 1 In this regard, it is instructive to note that whereas a majority of four Justices in
Maricopa County felt that the FMC agreements violated the price fixing rule as a matter of law, two
dissenting Justices, the Chief Justice and both lower courts felt that that precedent mandated a
denial of the state's motion for summary judgment on the issue.
"2 Having determined that per se condemnation was inappropriate, the district court in
Maricopa County concluded that even under a Rule of Reason analysis the state's motion could not
be granted because the record provided insufficient evidence as to the purpose and effect of the
FMC schedules and the power of the foundations and their member physicians. Maricopa County,
[1979-1] Trade Cas. (CCH), at 77,897.
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was exactly the result that Justice White was attempting to avoid in Broadcast
Music when he emphasized the legal inadequacy of substituting per se labels for
economic proof and the legal necessity of characterizing conduct as within the
"per se price fixing" category before facially condemning as such. 2 "
A. Characterization as a Flexibility Component in Per Se Analysis
Despite the implications of Justice Stevens' literal approach to per se,
analysis in Maricopa County, the Broadcast Music decision made it clear that the
per se rule against price fixing has not always been applied by the Court to
nullify every agreement which literally sets or affects prices. 2" Once an ar-
rangement has been properly characterized as "price fixing," the per se rule
unquestionably relieves the trier of fact of the burden of analyzing possible ben-
efits and harms associated with the challenged conduct. 215 Unless the anticom-
petitive purpose dr effect of the arrangement is palpably apparent, however,
such a characterization absent other proof is not proper. 216 In cases where
neither purpose nor effect is self-evident, before characterizing an agreement as
within the per se price fixing category, the court should make at least a
preliminary factual determination as to whether the purpose or effect of the
challenged agreement is indeed simply to stifle competition. 217
 Moreover, the
Supreme Court in the past has expressed considerable reluctance to character-
ize certain practices as falling within a per se category unless it has had consid-
erable prior experience with the type of relationship in question. 218
 Such reluc-
tance is consistent with the judiciary's ability to condemn a practice on its face
with reasonable assurance that its true purpose or effect is to stifle
competition . 216
In response to the state's argument that the FMC agreements were clearly illegal per se
because they lacked redeeming value and suppressed and destroyed competition, Judge Sneed,
writing for a majority of the Ninth Circuit panel in Maricopa County, stated: "The difficulty with
Arizona's position is that this record reveals nothing about the actual competitive effects of the
challenged arrangement nor do the authorities, primary or secondary, afford assurance concern-
ing its competitive impact." Maricopa County, 643 F.2d at 556 (emphasis added). See also id. at 560
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
213 Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 9.
2 " See Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2482 (Powell, J., dissenting); Broadcast Music, 441
U.S. at 8-9.
2 " National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978);
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
216
 L. SULLIVAN, supra note 25, § 74, at 199-200.
217 See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9, 19-20
(1979).
218
 See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9-10,
19 n.33 (1979); United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972); White Motor
Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963). For a discussion of the apparent divergence in
interpretation of the "need for considerable experience" language of Topco by the majority and
dissent in Maricopa County, see infra note 228.
219
 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text; cf. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
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Furthermore, as the Court's reasoning in Broadcast Music indicates, even if
the purpose or effect of an arrangement is to influence price, it may neverthe-
less avoid per se condemnation if the potential result of the activity is a substan-
tial increase in economic efficiency. 220 If potentially significant efficiencies are
initially apparent to a court, therefore, the improved economic performance
may outweigh a necessary impact on price competition. 22 ' Although such ac-
tivity would certainly not be per se legal — further judicial inquiry might reveal
the efficiencies created to be insignificant or the impact on competition com-
paratively excessive — it should escape a perfunctory per se price fixing label. 222
B. The Maricopa County Court's Inflexible Analysis
Thus, after Broadcast Music, the initial task for courts treating price fixing
challenges under section 1 of the Sherman Act is to characterize price affecting as
well as price effecting conduct as falling within or not w ithin the per se price fixing
category. 223 In Maricopa County, the Court was squarely faced with this
threshold issue. Yet the basis for the Maricopa County majority's determination
that the FMC maximum reimbursement agreements were per se price fixing
was never made explicit224 — that the complex insurance arrangements were
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19 n.33 (1979); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977).
220 Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. 19-23; see also United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978) (exchange of price data and other information among competitors
does not constitute per se violation if practices increase economic efficiency); Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54 (1977) (efficiencies in distribution of manufacturer's
products are "redeeming virtues" implicit in every decision sustaining vertical restrictions). Cf.
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2482 (1982) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing) (before characterizing arrangement as per se price fixing, court must determine whether pro-
competitive economics purportedly made possible are substantial and realizable in the absence of
arrangement).
221 Professor Bork argues that the possible presence of efficiencies can only be inferred
from a meaningful integration of the competitor's productive functions. Bork, Price Fixing, supra
note . 122, at 380-384. Thus, he notes, agreements which eliminate competition with no cor-
responding visible efficiency-creating potential are properly labeled as per se illegal. Id.; see also, L.
SULLIVAN, supra note 25, $ 77, at 206 (arrangement which through partial integration of func-
tions may achieve great economies of scale, may also avoid per se condemnation of price competi-
tion among participating forms).
Professor Easterbrook, however, persuasively asserts that in addition to highly in-
tegrated activities, certain maximum price agreements among competitors — such as the FMC
maximum reimbursement agreements — also attain visible and potentially significant cost-
saving efficiencies beneficial to consumers. Easterbrook, supra note 124, 891-900. Specifically, he
emphasized the Maricopa County agreements' tendency to reduce both the costs of searching for
low-price sellers and the transaction costs to consumers. Id,
222
	 Easterbrook concludes, for example, that the appropriate method for ana-
lyzing maximum price agreements is that used by the Court in Broadcast Music, i.e., if a judicial
examination reveals that significant efficiencies are at work, a more discerning inquiry is re-
quired. Id. at 901. If on the other hand, efficiencies are absent or not apparent, the arrangement
should be found per se illegal to avoid the large costs associated with litigating over small efficiency
gains. Id.
223 See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 9.
224 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2483-84 (Powell, J.,
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price fixing agreements within the meaning of the per se rule was assumed from
the beginning of the decision without explanation. 225 Presumably, then, the
majority believed the anticompetitive purpose or effect of the FMC plan was
self-evident, since the record was too sparse to give undisputed evidence of
either. 226 The Court did speculate on what anticompetitive effects might have
occurred as a result of the agreements."' Given the judiciary's admitted lack of
experience with both the business relationships involved in the FMC plans 228
and their impact upon the health care market, 229 however, it was unreasonably
dissenting). Justice Stevens was apparently content to distinguish Broadcast Music quickly and
then note that the foundations were not analogous to partnerships or other lawful joint ventures
because the physicians did not pool capital and share risks or opportunities for mutual gain.
Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2479-80. Of course, in this sense, the licensing agreement in Broad-
cast Music was equally unlike a lawful joint venture.
225 Id. at 2483-84 (Powell, J., dissenting).
226 See supra note 212.
227 See supra note 171. For a diametrically opposed view as to the probable economic ef-
fects of the FMC agreements, see Easterbrook, supra note 124, at 900-08.
1" Underlying the Maricopa County decision is a divergence of viewpoints in the Court as
to the need for and meaning of judicial experience with a challenged practice as a prerequisite to
per se condemnation, See generally, Broadcast Music, Inc. v, Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.,
441 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979); United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972). For
example, Justice Stevens limits his discussion of judicial inexperience in Maricopa County to the
Court's unfamiliarity with the health care industry. This factor, Justice Stevens notes, is irrele-
vant to per se price fixing analysis since the antitrust laws establish a uniform price fixing rule ap-
plicable to all industries alike. Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2476-77. He points out, however,
that such an argument should not be confused with Court's historical reluctance to establish a
new per se category without considerable experience with the particular restraint. Id. at 2476 n.19.
Implicit in such reasoning is the belief that past judicial experience is relevant only insofar as it
relates to a broad category of challenged activity to which the Court has or might assign a per se
label. Such an approach seems consisent with Justice Stevens' post-per se characterization
analysis since it is undisputed that once an activity has been properly characterized as within a per
se category, special procompetitive or industry facts are irrelevant.
In dissent, however, Justice Powell focuses on a narrower but correct characterization
concern. Describing the FMC agreement as novel, complex, and important to the public, Justice
Powell concentrates on whether past judicial experience affords an adequate background from
which to presume as a general matter that the particular arrangement before the Court has no
redeeming purpose except to stifle competition. Id. at 2680-85 (Powell, J., dissenting). According
to Justice Powell, such experience is a necessary prerequiste to the facial inclusion of the
challenged arrangement in a category of per se unlawful anticompetitive activity. Id. at 2483.
Thus, under Justice Powell's approach, even where an agreement involves the concerted setting
of a price, the novelty of the agreement and its market would be a determining factor in the
Court's ability to facially presume the practice's anticompetitive nature or lack of substantial
economics. Such an approach is consistent with the Broadcast Music Court's careful analysis of
both the economic effects of the ASCAP-BMI "price fixing" agreements and the music industry
in which the agreements operated. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.,
441 U.S. 1, 9-24 (1979); cf. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-9
(1977) (departure from Rule of Reason standard must be based on demonstrable economic effect
rather than formalistic line drawing).
229 In response to the state's argument that any collective effort to tamper with price
structures is offensive to antitrust policy, Judge Sneed, writing for the circuit court panel in
Maricopa County, concluded that the novelty of the market and the inadequacy of the record made
an inquiry into the affected areas of competition essential in determining whether a per se or even
a Rule of Reason should brand the practice illegal. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y,
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speculative for the Court to conclude summarily that the FMC maximum re-
imbursement agreements were plainly anticompetitive and without any
redeeming economic virtue. 23 °
This speculativeness was the basis for Justice :Powell's dissent in Maricopa
County. His criticism of the Court's failure to provide criteria by which a per se
characterization is to be determined was valid in light of precedent. 2 " Justice
Powell noted that "[the majority] is content simply to brand this type of plan as
`price fixing' and describe the agreement in Broadcast Music — which also
literally involved the fixing of prices — as 'fundamentally different.' "232 In
-deed, the Court distinguished the two cases almost entirely on the basis of the
FMC agreements' perceived failure to create a new product as a result of the
member physicians' cooperative behavior.'" Such a perfunctory basis for
distinction, however, is unpersuasive. 234
 As Justice Powell correctly noted, the
643 F.2d 553, 557-58 (9th Cir. 1980). For example, Judge Sneed noted that the record failed to
reveal how health insurers fix their own fee schedules or whether they exceed the FMC fees. Id. at
558. Judge Sneed further noted that it also failed to identify the nature and extent of competition
of FMC and non-FMC physicians, insurance carriers, hospitals and HMOs within the market.
Id. Accordingly, Judge Sneed declared that "[t]o affix the per re label to [the foundations'] con-
duct is	 to substitute an unsupported belief for proper proof." Id. at 557.
Judge Kennedy expressed similar factual concerns in his concurring opinion:
I agree with my brother Sneed that we know too little about the effects on competi-
tion produced by the practices here in question to brand them per se violations....
[Alt this point	 I am unable ... to say that these schedules "on [their] face
[have] the effect, or could have been spurred by the purpose, of restraining trade
among individual [physicians]." Broadcast Music, Inc, v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 13 ....
•	 •	 •	 •
Per se rules should be derived from considerations of economic impact in particular
cases illustrating the category of prohibited acts, and therefore a trial is appropriate
to explore further the impact on competition of the challenged reimbursement
schedules.
Id. at 560. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
no See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979)
(quoting National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) and
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
Justice Powell notes:
The Court acknowledges that the per se ban against price fixing is not to be invoked
every time potential competitors literally fix prices. One also would have expected it
to acknowledge that per se characterization is inappropriate if the challenged agree-
ment or plan achieves for the public procompetitive benefits that otherwise are not
attainable. The Court does not do this. And neither does it provide alternative
criteria by which the per se characterization is to be determined.
Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2483-84 (Powell, J., dissenting).
232 Id. at 2484.
"' See supra text accompanying notes 189-91.
234 Professor Easterbrook observes that the maximum price agreement in Maricopa Coun-
ty, like the blanket license in Broadcast Music, does change the identity of the final insurance prod-
uct by spreading the risk of unusual or complicated treatment between the physician and the insur-
ance company. Easterbrook, supra note 124, at 898-900. He questions, however, whether, from an
economic standpoint, "new product creation" should have been an important element in the Broad-
cast Music decision. Id. at 899 n.37. Professor Easterbrook points out that economists usually
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FMC reimbursement agreements created a new product to the same extent as
did the blanket license agreements in Broadcast Music.'" In Broadcast Music,
ASCAP and BMI simply pi-ovided an aggregate of what each composer would
otherwise individually offer to sell — the right to use a copyrighted composi-
tion. 236 The clearinghouses were able to distribute such rights more efficiently,
however, because utilization of a blanket license significantly reduced the tran-
saction costs which would otherwise have been incurred if each license were
bargained for individually. 237
Similarly, in Maricopa County, the foundation-endorsed medical insurance
was a novel means of providing fully-insured medical care from a large number
of participating physicians throughout the community in a more economical
manner. 238 That the FMC agreements were the most efficient means of devel-
oping and administering the maximum reimbursement schedules was evi-
denced by the willingness of various health insurers to participate in the
plan. 239 As such, the foundations permitted a more efficient form of health in-
surance — "to some extent, a different product. ,210
Moreover, although the Court asserted otherwise, it is arguable from the
record that the FMC insurance plans achieved substantial economic efficien-
cies not otherwise attainable without utilization of predetermined maximum
reimbursement schedules. The Court speculated that even if a maximum fee
schedule were necessary to achieve binding assurance of complete insurance
coverage as well as lower insurance premiums, it was not necessary that physi-
cians promulgate them."' Such an argument, however, ignores the economic
leave the definition of a "product" to popular convention, because its definition is arbitrary. Id.
A product, he notes, is "whatever bundle of attributes can be lumped conveniently together
under a single price and single name." Id.
"5 Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2484 n.12 (Powell, J., dissenting).
234
23r
	 Music, 441 U.S. at 20.23.
"8 Brief for Respondents at 8-9, 37-38.
'2 " Judge Sneed, in his circuit court opinion, noted that one of the reasons behind his
reluctance to apply a per se rule was a lack of evidence indicating that a conspiratorial exercise of
monopoly power of physicians would be so easily accepted by the insurance carriers. Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 643 F.2d 553, 557 (9th Cir. 1980).
In his Maricopa County dissent, Justice Powell reasoned:
On the record before us, there is no evidence of opposition to the foundation plan by
insurance companies — or, for that matter, by members of the public. Rather,
seven insurers willingly have chosen to contract out to the foundations the task of
developing maximum fee schedules. Again, on the record before us, we must infer,
that the foundation plan — open as it is to insurers, physicians, and the public —
has in fact benefitted consumers by enabling the insurance carriers to limit and to
calculate more efficiently the risks they underwrite,
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2482 (1982) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing); see also Easterbrook, supra note 124, at 903 (if buyers readily cooperate in a maximum price
arrangement they must perceive benefits; thus, an inquiry into behavior of buyers is valuable
evidence in separating cartels from efficiency-increasing maximum price agreements).
240 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2484 n.12 (1982)
(Powell, J., dissenting).
241 See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text. Justice Stevens noted it appeared like-
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efficiency emphasis of the Broadcast Music analysis. In Broadcast Music, the in-
dividual composers could have negotiated with each potential customer, 242 but
the transaction costs would have been extremely high for both buyers and
sellers. 243 The ASCAP and BMI blanket licenses were not perfunctorily labeled
as per se price fixing — even though they did fix a price for potential com-
petitors' products — because of the potential efficiencies and consequent
reduction of costs achieved by the arrangement. 244 The arrangement,
therefore, did not "facially [appear] to be one that would always or almost
always tend to restrict competition and therefore decrease output. " 245 Maricopa
County arguably presented less compelling facts regarding the likely inefficient
distribution of health care services and high transaction costs absent FMC
schedules. The record before the Court, however, did not support a presump-
tion that the FMC maximum reimbursement agreements were "naked
restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition, "246 but did
reveal a potential for substantial economies in health care insurance. 247
Reviewing the state's motion for summary judgment, the Court therefore
properly could have assumed that the reimbursement schedules promulgated
by the foundations were the most efficient and, indeed, a necessary method for
achieving full medical care coverage at reduced insurance premiums. 248 Based
on such an assumption, the Court should have held that, on the existing
record, a per se price fixing label was inappropriate. For the Court to have
substituted speculation for evidence in Maricopa County undermines the reason-
ing of Broadcast Music to the detriment of health care providers, insurers and
consumers.
Broadcast Music was only the most recent case in which the Supreme Court
looked closely at purported transactional economies as a preliminary inquiry
incident to per se analysis. In Continental T.V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. , 249 the
Court overruled its previous decision in United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co. 2"
ly that an insurance company could simply bypass the foundations by canvassing physicians to
determine proper reimbursement levels and dealing with the physicians directly. He reasoned
that a similar, if somewhat more protracted, physician approval process would occur if each insurer
offered a maximum fee schedule to each physician. Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2478 n.28 (em-
phasis added). Conversely, Justice Powell reasoned that participating insurers presumably
wished to utilize the FMC service because, unlike commercial products, the price and quality of
professional services are difficult to compare. Id. at 2482 n.6 (Powell, J., dissenting).
242 The Court in Broadcast Music pointed out that there was no legal, practical, or con-
spiratorial impediment to CBS's obtaining individual licenses; CBS, in short had a real choice."
Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 24.
243 Id. at 20-21.
"4 Id.
243
	 at 19-20.
246
 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
247 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2484 (1982) (Powell,
J., dissenting).
248 See generally Easterbrook, supra note 124 at 891-98.
249 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
"c) 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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In Schwinn, the Court articulated a "bright line" per se rule of illegality for ver-
tical territorial restrictions imposed by trade manufacturers on. distributors and
dealers."' The Schwinn Court did not, however, find all such non-price restric-
tions per se illegal. Rather, it held that the per se rule only applied when the
manufacturer had parted title with the product — otherwise, the restrictions
were to be evaluated under the Rule of Reason. 252 Closely reexamining the
Schwinn rationale, the GTE Court noted that Schwinn was a largely unexplained
departure from White Motor Co. v. United States, 453 where the Court had earlier
refused to endorse a per se rule for non-price vertical restrictions. 254 The GTE
Court further noted that the Schwinn distinction between per se and Rule of
Reason restrictions had no analytical basis, but instead apparently was prem-
ised on the Schwinn Court's "unexplained belief that a complete per se prohibi-
tion would be too 'inflexible.' " 255
The GTE Court admitted that vertical territorial restrictions reduced in-
trabrand competition. 256 Nevertheless, it reasoned that although competitive
economies have social, political and economic benefits, an antitrust policy
which failed to take into account market considerations would lack objective
benchmarks. 257 Thus, relying on scholarly and judicial authority, the Court
pointed to several redeeming economic features of the vertical restrictions, the
foremost of which was promotion of interbrand competition by allowing the
manufacturer to achieve certain distribution efficiencies. 258 The Court con-
cluded that any departure from the Rule of Reason standard was to be based
on "demonstratable economic effect rather than — as in Schwinn — upon
formalistic line drawing. "259
25 Id. at 379.
252 Id. at 379-80.
253 372 U.S. at 253.
"' GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 47.
255
	 at 54.
256 Id. at 54.
252 Id, at 53 n.21.
258 Id. at 54-58.
258 Id. at 59. Justice Stevens noted that the Court's refusal to examine the economic
justifications of the FMC "price fixing" agreements in Maricopa County was not inconsistent with
the Court's reexamination of the general validity of the per se rule rejected in GTE Sylvania.
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2476 n.19 (1982). It is submitted,
however, that it makes little analytic sense to distinguish between the necessity for a careful ex-
amination of economic justifications before creating a new per se category and a similar need for
economic inquiry prior to extending an existing per se category to include a novel arrangement
with apparent potential for substantial economic utility. See, e.g., Elman, "Petrified Opinions" and
Competitive Realities, 66 COLUM. L. REV, 625, 627 (1966) (realistic analysis of competitive prac-
tices is necessary, not only when question is whether practice is illegal under Rule of Reason, but
also when the question is whether existing per se categories should be extended to embrace prac-
tice); Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An Unprecedented Supreme Court Term — 1977,
77 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 989 (1977) (after GTE Sylvania, courts no longer have to wear "per se
blinders" in passing upon business restrictions which have redeeming virtues and may help to
promote competition).
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In his Maricopa County dissent, Justice Powell argued that the Court's deci-
sion in Professional Engineers was also consistent with careful judicial analysis in-
cident to a per se characterization. 260
 Justice Powell pointed out that the engin-
eers failed to have their restraints analyzed under a Rule of Reason because
their affirmative public health and safety justifications for a ban on competitive
bidding simply confirmed the anticompetitive nature of the agreements. 26 ' Ac-
cording to Justice Powell, a careful analysis subsequent to the final illegal price
fixing label foUnd no substantial procompetitive efficiencies . 262
In this instance, however, Justice Powell's use of Professional Engineers
seems somewhat questionable. 263
 If the Court did carefully search for signifi-
cant efficiency justifications, it did so implicitly, for there is certainly no explicit
language to that effect in the opinion. Nevertheless, unlike Maricopa County, at
least the final result is consistent with a proper preliminary analysis. For ex-
ample, in Professional Engineers the case was before the Court on a full trial
record which clearly indicated the severity of the agreement's anticompetitive
impact.'" Also, the engineers did not argue that the arrangement was either
procompetitive or significantly increased economic efficiency. 265
 Finally, unlike
Maricopa County, there were no identifiable potentially substantial efficiencies at
work which might have outweighed any necessary impact on competition.
In Maricopa County, therefore, the Supreme Court had an ideal opportuni-
ty both to delineate the parameters of the per se rule against price fixing and
clarify the proper analysis incident to characterizing an arrangement as within
the parameters of the rule. The facts of the case presented the Court with an
unfamiliar and complex business practice in which it was not self-evident that
the purpose or effect of the challenged agreements was simply to stifle competi-
tion. The state of the record was such as to preclude meaningful analysis of the
agreements' true competitive impact on the health care industry in relation to
its visible potential for achieving significant, cost-saving economic efficiencies
to the benefit of providers and consumers. In sum, the Court was in an ex-
cellent position to enunciate clear criteria by which the per se price fixing label is
to be applied. Based upon such criteria, the Court should have remanded the
case for a finding by the lower court either that the FMC agreement was indeed
within the per se price fixing category or that the practice was illegal under a
Rule of Reason approach. 266
260 Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2483 (Powell, J., dissenting).
261 Id.
262
263 Contrary to Justice Powell's assertion, the Professional Engineers Court did not deter-
mine the engineers' ban on bidding to lie illegalbecause it was a ,"price fixing" agreement, but
rather because is was obviously anticompetitive. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
264 Id. at 692-93.
266
	 at 693-94.
266 See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2485 n.13
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IV. A SUGGESTED PER SE APPROACH TO THE FMC AGREEMENTS
IN MARICOPA COUNTY
A. Flexibility and Per Se — A Not-So-Novel Approach
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not capitalize on the opportunity
presented in Maricopa County. Indeed, effectively ignoring the holding of its
previous decision in Broadcast Music, the Maricopa County Court did not allude
even to the need to characterize the FMC maximum reimbursement
agreements as within the per se price fixing category. Its failure to do so implies
a rigid per se concept which elevates legal form over economic proof in the name
of judicial efficiency. 267 Predictably, the result of such an uncompromising ap-
proach in Maricopa County was the perfunctory condemnation of a novel and
complex arrangement with an identifiable potential for proconsumer efficien-
cies within a market which has itself clearly failed to contain costs. Never-
theless, in spite of any contrary inferences which might be drawn from the
Maricopa County Court's rationale, it is submitted that the concepts of judicial
flexibility and judicial efficiency need not be mutually exclusive under the per se
rules. Yet, the per se flexibility necessary to reflect economic reality can be
maintained, and the apparently inconsistent notions of litigation efficiency and
economic efficiency can remain acceptably compatible, only if the judiciary
realizes that per se categories are not self-defining. 266
Thus, it is suggested that in characterizing conduct under the per se rules, a
realistic, preliminary analysis of the economic impact of a challenged practice
is necessary whenever the court has a strong reason to believe that the practice
may create substantia1 269 cost-saving efficiencies otherwise not attainable to the
benefit of consumers. As an inquiry consistent with traditional per se analysis,
however, any additional judicial investigation is justified only where such
potential for efficiency is initially visible to the court and the court is otherwise
unfamiliar with the actual competitive or efficiency effects of the challenged
practice. Immediate per se condemnation is proper, therefore, whenever the an-
ticompetitive purpose or effect of an agreement is clear — either its anticom-
petitive nature is self-evident or the record is sufficient to reveal anticompeti-
tive purpose or effect — and there are no apparent off-setting, significant effi-
(1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) (affirmance of district court would not foreclose eventual conclu-
sion on remand that arrangement should be deemed per se illegal); Arizona v. Maricopa County
Medical Soc'y, 643 F.2d 553, 560 (9th Cir. 1980) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (court not fore-
closed at later date, when it has more evidence, from concluding FMC schedules constitute per se
violation).
267 See Bork, Price Fixing, supra note 122, at 384.
"8 See Elman, supra note 259, at 627.
269 See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2482 (1982)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (per se inquiry focuses on whether purported economies are substantial
and realizable); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 21 (1979)
(blanket licenses substantially lower costs to potential advantage of buyers and sellers); see also
Easterbrook, supra note 124, at 901 n.45 (courts should disregard insubstantial efficiencies as a
basis of distinguishing beneficial maximum price agreements and cartels).
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ciency justifications. In such a case, notions of judicial efficiency must
outweigh any concern for flexibility and preclude additional litigation costs in-
curred by searching for possible procompetitive effects or insignificant efficien-
cy gains. 27° Moreover, the continued integrity of the per se rules requires that
any preliminary search for redeeming economic utility not merely encompass
the extensive and burdensome analysis mandated by a Rule of Reason ap-
proach."' Rather, the costly Rule of Reason analysis is justifiable only when
the party attacking a practice as per se illegal cannot initially prove, either by
means of precedent or other factual proof relevant to the economic conse-
quences of the practice, that the probable purpose or effect of the practice is
always or almost always to reduce competition and productive output as op-
posed to substantially increasing economic efficiencies to the benefit of con-
smilers. 272
Such an approach is hardly novel. The Supreme Court explicitly utilized it
in Broadcast Music"' and it is arguable that the Court implicitly adopted a
similar approach in GTE Sylvania and Professional Engineers by closely examining
transactional economies incident to per se analysis. 274 Justice Powell subse-
quently reiterated the necessity of such a per se approach in his dissenting opin-
ion in Maricopa County."' Consistent judicial application would tend to balance
more equally the consumer welfare concern of the Sherman Act 276 with the
litigation efficiency and business predictability notions of the per se rules at little
additional cost to the judiciary. For, as the Court pointed out in Broadcast
Music, the characterization of a "price fixing" arrangement as per se illegal still
"will often, but not always, be a simple matter. " 2" Admittedly, even the sug-
gested preliminary per se inquiry may entail litigation and predictability costs in
270 Easterbrook, supra note 124, at 901.
271 See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19 n.33
(1979).
272 See id. at 19-20.
"' As explained by the Broadcast Music Court:
[Tin characterizing ... conduct under the per se rule, our inquiry must focus on
whether the effect and, here because it tends to show effect, the purpose of the prac-
tice are to threaten the proper operation of our predominantly free-market economy
— that is, whether the practice facially appears to be one that would always or
almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output ... or instead one
designed to "increase economic efficiency and render markets more rather than less
competitive."
Id. (citations omitted).
274
 Ste supra text accompanying notes 249-64.
2" Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2482-84. (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell
argued that per se characterization is inappropriate if the challenged agreement achieves for the
public procompetitive economies that are otherwise not attainable. Id. at 2483-84.
276 See, e.g , Reiter v. Sonotone, 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (basic purpose of Sherman
Act is consumer welfare); Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. at 621 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (per se rules
developed and directed to protection of public welfare); Bork Legislative Intent and the Policy of the
Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 26 (1966) (prevention and crearion of efficiency is one means by
which consumer welfare is achieved under Sherman Act).
277 Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 9.
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excess of those associated with an overly-expedient per se approach of the type
utilized by the Supreme Court in Maricopa County. Nevertheless, it is submitted
that excessive judicial savings, predicated on inflexible per se reasoning di-
vorced from economic reality, are themselves too costly to the consumer in
light of the recommended standard. The standard serves simply to preclude
perfunctory facial condemnation of novel business practices when a court can-
not, with reasonable confidence, dismiss its asserted economic benefits.
B. The Approach Applied To Maricopa County
In Maricopa County, the state had not yet presented evidence sufficient
under the suggested approach to warrant a per se judgment. The respondent
foundations defended their activity primarily on the ground that maximum fee
reimbursement agreements were necessary to provide a unique form of cost-ef-
fective health insurance otherwise not available to consumers. 278 The founda-
tions submitted that the benefits which accrued because of their plans included:
1) a choice of physicians; 2) one hundred percent coverage of medical serv-
ices, and; 3) lower insurance costs. 279 The Maricopa County majority conceded
that binding assurance of complete coverage as well as the asserted potential for
lower insurance premiums could only be obtained if the insurer and individual
physicians agreed in advance on the maximum fee that the physicians would
accept as full payment. 28° Furthermore, the Court admitted that physicians
may be able to determine more efficiently the appropriate maximum fees to be
contained in any FMC-type schedules."' Additionally, it was undisputed that
insurers as well as consumers wished to utilize the FMC service. 282 Viewing the
limited summary judgment record in a light most favorable to the respondent
foundations, therefore, it supported an inference that the combined efforts of
physicians imposed a meaningful limit on physicians' charges, enabled partici-
pating- insurers to reduce costs, and thereby saved health care consumers mil-
lions of dollars in medical costs."'
2" Brief for Respondents, at 37-38.
279
28° Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2477 (1982).
2" Id. at 2478. The Court also noted that it was arguable that the existence of a fee
schedule makes it easier for insurers to calculate the risks they underwrite and to arrive at ap-
propriate reimbursement of insured claims. Id. at 2477 n.25.
282 Id. at 2482 (Powell, J., dissenting).
283 See supra note 193.
According to Professor Easterbrook, an inquiry into the potential for substantial cost-
saving efficiencies serves to distinguish between a beneficial maximum price arrangement and
the reduced output and higher price characteristics of a cartel. Easterbrook, supra note 124, at
901. See supra notes 221 & 269. If it is impossible to determine whether an agreement has led to an
increase in output, however, Professor Easterbrook suggests several other potentially helpful
avenues of judicial inquiry as a basis for such a distinction, including the concentration of the
sellers' market, the size of the market share of the sellers participating in the agreement and the
willingness of buyers to cooperate in the arrangement. Id. at 902-03. Likewise, he notes that such
an examination would be useful to detect a monopsony — a concentration of buyers in a par-
ticular market. Id. at 904-05. Professor Easterbrook concludes, based upon his suggested ap-
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Under the suggested per se approach, since the record thus revealed a
potential for substantial cost-saving efficiencies, it was initially encumbent
upon the state to show that the FMC agreements were plainly anticompetitive
and in fact created no redeeming efficiencies. Although the foundations ad-
mitted that they had literally set maximum prices for physicians' services,
under the proposed standard this alone is an insufficient evidentiary basis for
per se price fixing condemnation. Additionally, despite the fact that price com-
petition among physicians participating in the FMC's arguably was reduced by
a maximum fee schedule, the extent of that competitive impact within the
market was neither self-evident nor revealed by the limited record. 284 This is
particularly true given the Court's lack of precedential experience with the ac-
tual economic consequences of similar practices. 285 Moreover, it was disputed
whether periodic increases in the reimbursement levels were the cause or the
result of increases in the prevailing rates for medical care in the relevant
markets. 286 Clearly, the state had not shown that the purpose or effect of the
FMC agreements was to "threaten the proper operation of our predominantly
free-market economy. "287 Finally, in support of its motion for summary judg-
ment, the state introduced no factual evidence supporting its argument that
participating insurers could more efficiently develop the schedules necessary to
achieve the apparent cost-savings associated with the FMC
In sum, under the recommended approach to per se analysis, the state in
Maricopa County did not meet its burden of proving that the FMC agreements
were plainly anticompetitive without substantial efficiency justifications. The
limited summary judgment record, therefore, did not support the Supreme
Court's expedient per se condemnation of the maximum fee reimbursement
agreements in Maricopa County.
CONCLUSION
The Maricopa County decision is unprecedented in its clear per se condemna-
tion of an agreement among professionals. More surprising, however, was the
Supreme Court's out-of-hand rejection of the FMC maximum reimbursement
proach, that the maximum fee reimbursement arrangement in Markopa County was neither a
cartel in disguise nor a monopsony. Id. at 903 n.50, 904-05. He points out that the argument that
maximum price agreements among efficient market incumbents — such as FMC physicians
engaged in fee for service practice — may deter entry into a market "is ridiculous when referring
to more efficient potential entrants and implausible when referring to entrants that must operate
at a certain minimum scale to be efficient. It safely can be disregarded as a source of antitrust
concern." Id. at 908.
284 See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
285 As Justice Powell noted, the "Court cite[d] no case in which a remotely comparable
plan or agreement is condemned on a per se basis." Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2481 (Powell,
J., dissenting).
286 Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2471 n.10.
287 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19 (1979).
288 Maricopa County, 102 S. Ct. at 2482 n.6 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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agreements on an admittedly limited summary judgment record. Although the
challenged agreements in fact fixed prices paid to physicians for medical serv-
ices, the record supported an inference that the FMC arrangements also
achieved substantial cost-saving efficiencies not otherwise attainable to the
benefit of health care providers and consumers.
The Court's literal characterization of the agreements as per se price fixing
was not supported by its recent decision in Broadcast Music, especially in light of
its inexperience with the economic effects of the maximum fee schedules and
the industry in which they were utilized. Although the per se concept necessarily
involves a trade-off between litigation efficiency and consumer welfare, the
Court's approach weighs too heavily in favor of the former at the expense of the
latter. In Maricopa County, the result of such an approach has made clear the
danger of simplistic labelling in complex cases — potentially cost-saving,
consumer-oriented arrangements may be prematurely and unnecessarily cast
aside. Broad generalizations about certain types of business conduct form the
basis of the per se rules; however, these generalizations are reasonable only
when either the courts have had considerable experience with the adverse
economic impact of the conduct they wish to include within an existing per se
category or the record contains facts sufficient to support an undisputed in-
ference that the challenged conduct is plainly anticompetitive without redeem-
ing efficiency justifications.
It is submitted that Maricopa County was prematurely and, therefore, incor-
rectly decided. According to the per se approach suggested by this casenote, as a
threshold analysis incident to a per se characterization, the Court should have
determined whether, despite their necessary impact on price, the FMC maxi-
mum reimbursement schedules created redeeming, substantial cost-saving effi-
ciencies beneficial to health care consumers. It is further submitted that the
limited summary judgment record in this case together with judicial economic
inexperience with the challenged agreements supported such a determination.
Accordingly, the FMC agreements should not have been characterized as per se
illegal price fixing.
BRIAN J. KNEZ
